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ABSTRACT
For governmental audit and compilation reports to be relevant, they must be prepared and
made available to the public in a timely manner. The purpose of this study is to identify
variables that have an influence on audit and compilation report delay in governments. This
research utilizes ordinary-least-squares regression to estimate the effects of several variables of
interest on the time it takes to file the audit or compilation report with the Office of the State
Auditor. The research also utilizes logistic regression to estimate the effects of several variables
of interest on the incidence of filing the audit or compilation report after the state-mandated
filing deadline versus filing on time. Data were gathered from audit and compilation reports of
Mississippi counties and municipalities for fiscal-year 2007.
The research questions addressed in this study were chosen based on the anticipated
impact on audit timeliness of (1) report message content and managerial competency, (2)
accountability, and (3) the audit environment. The results of the study indicate that the areas of
report message content and managerial competency as well as the audit environment both play
an important role in audit report and compilation report timeliness. The government’s level of
accountability was found to be less associated with report timeliness.
A higher number of audit findings was found to be associated with longer audit report
delay and longer compilation report delay as well as with late audits and late compilations.
Entities receiving an adverse or qualified opinion were significantly associated with longer audit
report delay as well as with late audits. The travel distance between the auditor’s office and the
audit client’s office was also found to play a role in audit and compilation report timeliness. For
ii

full-scope audit engagements, a greater travel distance was associated with late audit filings,
particularly when entities that represented their audit firm’s only governmental attestation client
were removed from the sample. Travel distance played a more important role with compilation
engagements, as it was significantly associated with compilation report delay and was associated,
to a lesser degree, with late compilation reports. A greater amount of long-term debt carried by
the governmental entity was not found to be associated with shorter audit delays but was found
to be somewhat associated with audits filed within the state-mandated one-year window.
Overall, these results provide useful information for both small and large governmental entities
that wish to improve the timeliness of their financial reporting.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of a financial-statement audit is to provide a level of assurance
concerning whether an entity’s financial statements are presented fairly in conformity with
specified criteria. For local governmental entities, audited financial statements are the primary
means for communicating the results of operations and financial position to outside parties. The
auditor’s report also provides important information about the management of the government,
such as the adequacy of internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations. For
auditors’ reports to be relevant, they must be prepared and made available to the public in a
timely manner.
Many smaller governmental entities are not required to undergo a full-scope audit of their
financial statements. These entities are allowed to prepare a compiled financial report that
presents the government’s cash receipts and disbursements during the period. In lieu of a fullscope audit, these entities are subject to an independent auditor’s performance of certain agreedupon procedures, such as confirmation of cash balances, verification of tax collections, and
examination of compliance with purchasing requirements. Like full-scope audit reports, these
compilation reports are the primary means for communicating information about the
management of the government. To be relevant to interested users, these reports must also be
prepared and made available to the public in a timely manner.
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Governmental Financial Reporting and Concerns for Timeliness
The timeliness of governmental financial reporting is of primary interest to many parties,
including the U.S. Congress, federal granting agencies, creditors, government officials, and
private citizens. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), whose mission is to
ensure greater accountability and well informed decision making through excellence in publicsector financial reporting, highlights the importance of the timeliness of audited financial
statements. GASB Concepts Statement No. 1: Objectives of Financial Reporting lists timeliness,
along with relevance, reliability, understandability, comparability, and consistency, as one of the
six qualitative characteristics necessary for effective financial reporting. The GASB further
states within that Concepts Statement that “if financial statements are to be useful, they must be
issued soon enough after the reported events to affect decisions” (GASB 1987, p.24).
Jones et al. (1985) suggests that the inclusion of timeliness in Concepts Statement No. 1
was perhaps in response to the results of a study the GASB published in 1985, which indicated
that approximately 90 percent of all users of governmental financial reports believed timeliness
to be an important characteristic of governmental financial reporting. Of 72 items investigated
by the GASB in that study, timely issuance of audited financial reports was most often rated by
interviewees as “useful” or “extremely useful”, thus ranking timeliness as one of the most
important aspects of financial reporting.
It appears, however, that the timeliness objective has not often been achieved in
governmental financial reporting. In the mid-1990s, the GASB conducted a series of focusgroup sessions, which resulted in interviewees complaining that municipal audit delay had
become a significant problem for financial statement users (Crain & Bean 1998). Many of the
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participants in these studies indicated that the best improvement in financial reporting would be
to require the timely production of audited financial reports (Crain 1998).
In 1998, the National Federation of Municipal Analysts (NFMA), an organization with
the goals of promoting professionalism in municipal credit analysis and furthering the skill level
of its members, issued a position paper concerning the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC)’s amendments to Rule 15c2-12. According to the SEC, the amendments to that Rule were
designed to enhance the quality, timing, and dissemination of disclosure in the municipal
securities market. The NFMA’s position paper stated that “the goal of increasing the availability
of timely information has been hampered by the absence of a filing deadline” (NFMA 1998).
The NFMA stated that outdated financial information is, at best, worthless, and, at worst,
materially misleading with respect to the current condition of the issuer. The Federation
recommended that amendments be further modified to require annual updated information to be
filed within 180 days of fiscal year end for tax-supported governmental bond issues and within
120 days for revenue-bond and private-activity-bond issues. At present, no such amendment has
been promulgated.
Currently, the timeliness of financial reporting is one of the most frequent and common
concerns expressed to the GASB by users of state and local governmental financial reports. In
2005, the GASB, as part of an extensive study of the needs of users of governmental financial
information, interviewed more than 250 financial-statement users. One of the questions
presented to interviewees was “What issues would you like to bring to the GASB’s attention?”.
The overwhelming first response was that audited financial statements needed to be issued in a
more timely manner (Mead 2011). In a 2011 Research Brief, the GASB published the results of
a survey of users of governmental financial statements concerning the usefulness of reported
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financial information as time progresses. Findings from that study indicated that financial
information retains some of its usefulness for up to six months after fiscal year end, but the
relative usefulness of that information diminishes quickly as time progresses within those six
months. That study also compared the actual time to issue audited financial statements to the
survey results. This comparison indicated that the reported information was seriously
diminished due to the timing of reporting in 23 percent of larger governmental financial reports
and 44 percent of smaller governmental financial reports (Mead 2011).
Findings from Merritt (2010) and Mead (2011) indicated that even with the concern
expressed by various financial statement users, the timeliness of the preparation and subsequent
audit of governmental financial statements is not improving. In fact, comparing the audit delay1
findings from Dwyer & Wilson (1989) to the findings from Merritt (2010) and Mead (2011), the
delay has increased by approximately two months since that earliest study. 2 Dwyer & Wilson
(1989) noted an average audit delay for municipalities of approximately 107 days, while Merritt
(2010) and Mead (2011) each noted an average audit delay of around 170 days.

Concerns for Audit Timeliness in Mississippi
Cagle & Pridgen (2011), in their examination of counties in Mississippi, reported an
average audit delay of 420 days. In contrast, Mead (2011) reported an average audit delay of
around 244 days for similar-sized counties in other states. A comparison of these studies
provides a clear indication of the extent of a timeliness problem existing in Mississippi.
1

Audit delay has been defined in prior empirical studies as the number of days from the governmental
entity’s fiscal year end to the date of the audit report, although Dwyer & Wilson (1989) performed additional
analysis of the time from the entity’s fiscal year end to the date the audit report was actually mailed to the
appropriate agency. In this current study, audit delay is defined as the number of days from the governmental
entity’s fiscal year end to the date the audited financial statements were received by the office of the state auditor
since that date is closer to the time in which the financial statements are available to the public.
2
A thorough examination of these studies is presented in Chapter II.
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Section 21-35-31 (1) of the Mississippi Code (Code) requires all municipalities to have
an annual audit or compilation, depending on the magnitude of the municipality’s revenues or
expenditures. All Mississippi counties are required to have a full-scope audit. According to the
Code, the engagements shall be completed before the close of the next succeeding fiscal year.
The state has, however, experienced problems concerning the completion of those engagements
within that specified time. For example, in December 2009, Hinds County Supervisor, Phil
Fisher, was quoted as saying “For years the county ran two years behind—for whatever
reasons—getting its audit done” (Baydala 2009). Considering the findings from Cagle &
Pridgen’s (2011) study of Mississippi counties, which indicated an average audit delay of 420
days, it is evident that other Mississippi counties have also experienced timeliness difficulties.
Carslaw et al. (2007) suggests that an apparent lack of significant discipline has allowed
governmental entities to function outside of proper accounting procedures without consequence,
and that noncompliance provides great opportunity for fraud. That study states that
consequences should be introduced to ensure compliance. The authors suggest that the
government institute a policy that grant monies would be reduced in years subsequent to failure
in compliance.
Timely completion of county and municipal audits in Mississippi has become an
important issue in the state, and new consequences have been introduced to help ensure that
future timeliness will be enhanced. The Mississippi Municipal Audit Guide, dated July 2010,
outlines the steps that will be taken for those entities that fail to submit a timely audit report to
the state auditor. If the state auditor determines that a municipality has not initiated efforts to
comply with reporting deadlines, the state auditor will file a certified written notice with the
clerk of the municipality notifying that a certificate of noncompliance will be issued to the State
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Tax Commission and to the Attorney General after 30 days unless the municipality substantially
complies with filing requirements within that time. If, after 30 days, the municipality has not
substantially initiated efforts to comply, the State Tax Commission will withhold from all
allocations and payments to the municipality the amount necessary to pay 150 percent of the cost
of preparing the required audit or report as contracted for by the state auditor. The State Tax
Commission will transfer those amounts to the state auditor to be used in completing the audit.
All funds remaining after the completion of the audit will be retained by the state auditor to
offset administrative costs.
In addition to the potential for counties and municipalities to lose 150 percent of the cost
of the audit, those entities also face the danger of losing certain federal funds. In Hinds County,
for example, missed audit reporting deadlines have held up $1.6 million in stimulus grants for
repaving roads and more than $1 million for beautification work. Since local governments must
spend stimulus dollars by certain deadlines, there are concerns that the county could lose the
funding altogether. Also, money allotted for beautification was from a competitive pool that is
“first come, first served,” meaning it could go to another county or city (Baydala 2009).
To provide a clearer picture of the extent of the timeliness problem in Mississippi, one
can examine the mean audit delay observed in prior studies compared with the mean audit delay
that has occurred in Mississippi. In nine studies examining data during the periods from 1982 to
2009, the mean audit report delay ranged from a low of 100 days to a high of 8.13 months
(approximately 244 days). The mean audit report delay in Mississippi for fiscal year 2007 was
403 days for counties and 267 days for municipalities.3 Additionally, Payne & Jenson (2002)
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Audit report delay in these prior studies was defined as the number of days from the government’s fiscal
year end to the date on the audit report. In fiscal-year 2007, for Mississippi entities, the average number of days
from the fiscal year end to the date on the audit report was 403 days for counties and 267 days for municipalities,
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examined audit delay among eight southeastern states and observed that Mississippi had the
longest audit delay of any of the sampled states. A thorough examination of each of these
studies is presented in Chapter II.

Statement of the Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to examine what variables influence audit delay for local
governments in Mississippi. Since the Mississippi Code provides a one-year deadline for
submission of the completed audits to the state auditor, this study also considers the determinants
of late audit filings in Mississippi and what variables differ between governments that file audits
late versus governments that file audits in a timely manner. The study also examines what
variables influence the delay of compilation reports for smaller municipalities in Mississippi, as
well as the variables that differ between governments that file compilations late versus
governments that file compilations in a timely manner. The research questions addressed in this
study are chosen based on the anticipated impact on audit timeliness of (1) report message
content and managerial competency, (2) accountability, and (3) the audit environment.
Administrators and elected officials are expected to signal fiscal competence and
stewardship to the citizens, investors, and other users (McLelland & Giroux 2000). Hirshleifer
(1993) suggested that managers’ incentives are to advance the arrival of good news and to delay
the arrival of bad news. One circumstance in which management has incentive to signal
competent performance is when there exists a favorable message to be reported. Elements of a
favorable report message include strong financial performance, an absence of audit findings in
the auditor’s report, and an unqualified audit opinion. A favorable report message will result, in

while the average number of days from fiscal year end to the date the Office of the State Auditor received the report
was 489 days for counties and 344 days for municipalities.
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part, from competent management of the governmental entity. Concerning the impact of report
message content and managerial competency on audit timeliness, the following research
questions are addressed in this study:

1)

Is the financial report message, as evidenced by key financial
statement ratios, a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

2)

Is the total number of reported audit findings a significant predictor of (a) audit
report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing
deadlines?

3)

Is a qualified or adverse audit opinion a significant predictor of (a) audit
report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing
deadlines?

Differing levels of accountability may also influence the timing of the audit report. For
example, the presence of debt is expected to increase monitoring of municipal performance by
creditors (Evans & Patton 1987). Also, entities subject to the additional requirements imposed
by the Single Audit Act have a greater level of accountability, and Single Audit reports are
subject to earlier deadlines in which reports must be submitted to the Federal Audit
Clearinghouse. Concerning the impact of increased accountability to outside parties, the
following research questions are addressed in this study:
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4)

Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor
of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet statemandated filing deadlines?

5)

Is the earlier filing deadline required under the Single Audit Act a significant
predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet
state-mandated filing deadlines?

Finally, the audit environment unique to each governmental entity may also impact the
timing of the audit report. The various complexities of an audit can lead to potential delays,
while the expertise of the auditor can also have an effect on the time it takes to complete the
audit in a timely manner. Concerning the impact of the audit environment, the following
research questions are addressed in this study:

6)

Is the number of major funds reported in the government’s financial
statements a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

7)

Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s office a
significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?
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8)

Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

Smaller municipalities in Mississippi are allowed to submit a compilation report to the
state auditor in lieu of a full-scope audit. The auditors of those entities are only required to
complete certain limited agreed-upon procedures. As such, many of the research questions
outlined above will not be applicable to those engagements. The compiled financial statements,
for example, are limited to a statement of cash receipts and disbursements, therefore key
financial ratios based on accrual accounting often cannot be extracted from those statements.
Also, the auditor expresses no opinion concerning the fair presentation of financial information.
Finally, municipalities required to file according to the Single Audit Act must also complete a
full-scope audit. With respect to these limited-scope engagements, the following research
questions are addressed in this study:

9)

Is the total number of reported findings a significant predictor of (a) compilation
report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated
filing deadlines?

10)

Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor
of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to
meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

10

11)

Is the number of funds reported in the government’s financial
statements a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b)
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

12)

Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the compilation client’s
office a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

13)

Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b)
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

Research Design and Methodology
This research utilizes ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression to estimate the effects of
several variables of interest on the time it takes to file the audit report with the Mississippi Office
of the State Auditor (OSA). The research also utilizes logistic regression to estimate the effects
of several variables of interest on the incidence of filing the audit report after the state-mandated
one-year filing deadline versus filing on time. OLS regression is also used to estimate the effects
of several variables of interest on the time it takes to file compilation reports with the state
auditor, and logistic regression is used to estimate the effects of variables of interest on the
incidence of filing the compilation report after the state-mandated one-year filing deadline versus
filing on time.
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The majority of the prior studies of governmental audit delay measured audit delay as the
number of days between the governmental entity’s fiscal year end and the date on the audit
report. In this study, audit delay is measured as the number of days between the entity’s fiscal
year end and the date the audit or compilation was received by the state auditor’s office. This
measure is perceived to be superior, as it more closely represents the date in which the reports
are made available to the public. The date on the audit report is also subject to manipulation and
inconsistent interpretation and application of the auditing standards. Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 103: Audit Documentation, which was effective for audits after December 15,
2006, affected the dating of the audit report. According to that Statement, audit reports are to be
dated no earlier than the date on which the auditor has obtained sufficient appropriate evidence
to support the opinion. Sufficient appropriate evidence includes evidence that the documentation
has been reviewed and that the financial statements have been prepared and that management has
represented that they have taken responsibility for them. Prior to this Statement, the date on the
audit report was made in reference to the end of field work. This reference now ceases to exist,
therefore the report date and the release date should be close to each other.
In this study, cities and counties required to complete full-scope audits had an average
time of 312 days from fiscal year end to the date on the audit report versus an average time of
400 days from fiscal year end to the date the audit report was received by the state auditor’s
office. Mississippi entities allowed to complete a compilation engagement had an average time
of 232 days from fiscal year end to the date on the compilation report versus an average time of
289 days from fiscal year end to the date the compilation report was received by the state
auditor’s office. These figures provide information that the concepts underlying SAS No. 103
were not consistently applied in Mississippi for fiscal-year 2007. As such, the time from fiscal
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year end to the date the report was received by the state auditor’s office is the most appropriate
measure to use in this study to capture true audit report delay.
Data used in the study will include all county and municipal audit reports filed in
Mississippi for fiscal-year 2007, with the exception of audits completed by the OSA. Fiscal-year
2007 was chosen because it was the most recent year in which substantially all the audit reports
were completed and available for examination.

Results
The results of the study indicate that the area of report message content and managerial
competency plays an important role in audit report and compilation report timeliness. In this
area, financial statement ratios, measuring financial position and performance; the number of
audit findings; and the type of audit opinion were examined. Each was found to have some
relation to report timeliness.
An examination of two key financial statement ratios in the study revealed somewhat
conflicting results. The financial position of the entity, as reflected by the ratio of total net assets
to total revenues, was not significantly associated with audit delay. Interestingly, an examination
of the financial performance of the entity, as reflected by the ratio of the change in net assets to
total revenues, revealed an association with longer audit delay, which was opposite of the
direction predicted. This relationship was significant but was influenced by an outlying
observation. When the outlier was removed from the model, the relationship was no longer
statistically significant. The findings regarding these ratios warrant future research regarding
their effect on audit timeliness.
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The number of audit findings, a variable that has been previously unexamined in
municipal audit delay, was significant in explaining audit delay. A higher number of audit
findings was associated with longer reporting delays as well as with late audits. Further
examination into this area revealed evidence that the quantity of findings influenced audit report
timing to a greater degree than did the materiality of those findings. The number of findings was
also significantly associated with longer delays for compilation reports as well as with late
compilation reports.
Entities receiving an adverse or qualified opinion were significantly associated with
longer audit delays as well as with late audits. The majority of the prior studies of governmental
audit delay (Dwyer & Wilson, 1989; Rubin, 1992; and McClelland & Giroux, 2000) did not find
a significant association between the audit opinion and audit delay. Payne & Jenson (2002),
however, found that a qualified audit opinion was significantly associated with longer delays.
The finding in this study is consistent with Payne & Jenson (2002) and provides further evidence
to support their finding.
The government’s level of accountability was found to be less associated with report
timeliness. In that area, the research examined the amount of long-term debt held by the
governmental entity as well as whether the entity was required to report according to the
requirements of the Single Audit Act. A greater amount of long-term debt carried by the entity
was not found to be associated with shorter audit delays but was found to be somewhat
associated with audits filed within the state-mandated one-year window. The amount of longterm debt was not significantly related to shorter delays or timely reports for entities preparing
compilation reports. Governmental entities required to report in accordance with the
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requirements of the Single Audit Act were not found to have had shorter audit delays nor were
they found to have reported in a timely manner because of the increased accountability.
The audit environment was found to play an important role in audit report and
compilation report timeliness. In that area, the research examined the total number of funds
reported by the entity, the travel distance between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s
office, and the level of expertise of the auditor.
The number of major funds was not significantly associated with longer audit reporting
delays or late audits. When the variable was recoded as a categorical variable similar to prior
research (coded 0 if the entity reported three or fewer major funds and 1 if the entity reported
greater than three funds), the number of major funds was still not associated with longer audit
reporting delays but was somewhat associated with late audits. The number of funds was not
associated with longer compilation reporting delays or late compilations.
Results of the study provided evidence that the travel distance between the auditor’s
office and the audit client’s office, a variable that has not previously been examined in prior
studies of governmental audit delay, plays a role in audit timeliness. For full-scope audit
engagements, a greater travel distance was not associated with longer audit delay but was
associated with late audit filings, particularly when entities that represented their audit firm’s
only governmental attestation client were removed from the sample. Travel distance played a
more important role with compilation engagements. Travel distance was significantly associated
with compilation report delay and was associated, to a lesser degree, with late compilation
reports.
The auditor’s expertise, as measured by the total number of governmental attestation
engagements the firm completed for the fiscal year, had no significant association with audit
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report delay or with late audits. For compilations, some evidence was observed that indicated
that auditor expertise led to shorter compilation report delay. Auditor expertise was not found to
have a significant relationship with late versus timely compilations.
In the model for full-scope audits, a control variable was included coded 0 if the
government was a municipality and 1 if the government was a county. Consistent with findings
from prior research (Johnson 1998), counties in this study were associated with significantly
longer reporting delays when compared with municipalities. Counties were also significantly
associated with late audits.
As previously mentioned, prior studies of governmental audit delay measured delay as
the number of days between the entity’s fiscal year end and the date on the audit report. The
findings from this study were based on the measurement of audit delay as the number of days
between the entity’s fiscal year end and the date the report was received by the state auditor’s
office. This measure is deemed to be superior since it more closely captures the time in which
reports will be made available to the public and is less subject to manipulation and inconsistent
application of the auditing standards. For purposes of comparison, the OLS and logistic
regressions from this study were also completed after measuring delay consistent with prior
research. These results yielded some inconsistencies regarding the variables in the model when
compared with the results from the model in which delay was measured as the number of days
between fiscal year end and the date in which the reports were received by the state auditor’s
office. This indicates that the method in which audit report delay is defined can influence the
findings regarding variables perceived to affect audit delay.
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Importance of the Research
Figure 1 presents a histogram illustrating the frequencies in which Mississippi
governments completing full-scope audits for fiscal-year 2007 filed those audits during certain
ranges of time with the Mississippi Office of the State Auditor. The most populated category in
the histogram is the window of time from 366 days to 400 days. This indicates that many
governments in Mississippi missed the filing deadline by approximately a month or less. With a
better understanding of the factors that affect audit timeliness, these entities may better be able to
decrease reporting time and avoid the ramifications of the newly established consequences set
forth in the Mississippi Municipal Audit Guide.
Figure 1: Frequencies in Which Full-Scope Audit Reports Were Submitted to the Mississippi Office of
the State Auditor for Fiscal-year 2007
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The findings from this study are important not only to governmental entities but also to
governmental auditors, state auditors, and other third parties, such as creditors and federal
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granting agencies, that use governmental financial statement information. Governmental entities
desiring a more timely audit for any reason, such as the desire to obtain grant monies, can use the
information to help determine if selection of an auditor with different characteristics than their
current auditor might aid in timeliness. The study may also highlight areas of potential
improvement within the governmental entity that might aid in audit timeliness.
For governmental auditors concerned with audit timeliness, this study may provide
information concerning client-specific attributes that affect the timeliness of completing the
audit. Knowledge of these variables may help these auditors in determining whether to accept a
certain audit client for a future engagement and whether that engagement may be completed in a
timely manner. As parties become more aware of the types of variables that influence audit
timing, steps can be taken to improve overall timeliness.
Also, as previously mentioned, Mississippi is taking new steps, effective July 2010, to
help ensure that future timeliness will be enhanced. The current study examines reporting
timeliness for fiscal-year 2007, before these new steps were taken. As such, the findings from
this study will provide a reference point for a future study concerning the success of these steps
after they have been instituted in Mississippi. This study is an important first step in determining
whether “the goal of increasing the availability of timely information has been hampered by the
absence of a filing deadline” (NFMA 1998).

Contributions of the Study
This study adds to the existing literature in a number of ways. A major contribution of
this study is that it is the first study of governmental audit delay to examine differences between
entities that file audits in a timely manner versus entities that fail to meet audit reporting
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deadlines. The study measures audit delay as the time between fiscal year end and the date the
report is received by the state auditor’s office. This measure more closely captures the time in
which the reports are made available to the public. The study also illustrates that the effects of
some variables differ depending on whether audit delay is measured as the time between fiscal
year end and the date on the audit report (as most prior studies have measured delay) or the time
between fiscal year end and the date the report is received by the state auditor’s office. Another
major contribution is that this is the first study to examine reporting delay for governmental
entities required only to submit a compilation report in lieu of completing and submitting a fullscope audit report.
Also, since the most recent empirical study of audit timeliness in local governments
(McLelland & Giroux 2000) examined data from fiscal year 1996, this is the first empirical study
that has considered timeliness following the enactment of GASB Statement No. 34.
Additionally, prior studies (Dwyer & Wilson, 1989; Rubin, 1992; Johnson, 1996; Johnson, 1998;
McLelland & Giroux, 2000; Johnson et al., 2002; Payne & Jenson, 2002) have only considered
municipalities with populations greater than 5,000. The majority (approximately 79 percent) of
the populations of municipalities in Mississippi fall below 5,000. This study also includes
several variables expected to influence governmental audit delay that prior studies have not
considered. These include financial statement ratios measuring financial position and
performance, audit findings, number of reported major funds, and travel distance between the
auditor’s office and the audit client’s office.
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Limitations of the Study
The expected results of this study are subject to some important limitations. The sample
for this study was not randomly obtained but instead uses data from counties and municipalities
from one state. As such, caution should be used in generalizing these results to other geographic
regions. Also, the smaller populations of the observations in this study are not comparable to the
larger populations of the samples examined in prior studies. Since this study examines several
variables not addressed in prior studies, the findings regarding those variables may not be
generalizable to entities with larger populations.
In logistic regression, a rule of thumb states that about ten events per variable are
necessary in order to get reasonably stable estimates of the regression coefficients (Peduzzi et al.
1996). The logistic regression model for full-scope-audit entities in the study has about seven
events per variable. Although more recent research has concluded that the “Rule of Ten” can be
relaxed (Vittinghoff & McCulloch 2006), an increased sample size in this study could have
possibly led to different conclusions.
Finally, the explanatory power of the OLS model for the full-scope-audit entities in this
study compares quite favorably to the models used in prior studies. The explanatory model of
the OLS model for compilation entities, however, is weaker in comparison. Future research will
be warranted to gain a better understanding of those areas that influence delay for these types of
engagements.

Organization
The following chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows. Chapter Two
includes a literature review of prior empirical work related to governmental audit delay. Chapter
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Three states the research questions and summarizes the methodologies used to analyze the
variables that impact audit delay and the variables that differ between entities filing audits within
the specified time period versus the entities that fail to file in a timely manner. Chapter Four
explains the results of the dissertation, and Chapter Five summarizes the conclusions and
limitations of this study.
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CHAPTER II - LITERATURE REVIEW
Several studies have addressed the issue of audit delay as it relates to governmental
entities. Each study established audit delay, measured as the number of days from the
governmental entity’s fiscal year end to the date on the audit report, as the dependent variable
and utilized ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression to gather evidence about the effects of a
number of independent variables. Beginning with Dwyer & Wilson (1989), each study
incorporated different combinations of independent variables, often removing some of the
variables from the prior studies, retaining others, and adding new variables not considered in
prior studies.

Prior Research on Audit Delay in Local Governments
It is important to note the differences in sample characteristics across each of the prior
studies of governmental audit delay before the studies are examined in detail. Key
characteristics and mean audit report delay for each previous study are summarized in Table 1.
Dwyer & Wilson (1989) investigated a sample of 142 cities for fiscal year 1982 and developed
an explanatory model of reporting timeliness based on incentives for management signaling, the
message contained within the annual report, and regulatory and technological constraints. Rubin
(1992) examined 79 Ohio cities with populations greater than 10,000 for fiscal year 1986 and
assessed the differences in audit fees charged and audit timeliness between state and privatesector auditors. Johnson (1996) examined 192 comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs)
of cities with populations greater than 50,000. That study built on the prior literature by
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Table 1 - Prior Studies of Local Government Audit Delay

Study
Dwyer and
Wilson,
1989
Rubin,
1992

Fiscal
Sample
n
Year
Characteristics
142 1982 U.S. cities with available
time series bond data;
Population > 25,000
79 1986 Ohio cities;
Population > 10,000

Johnson,
1996

192

1993

U.S. cities with CAFRs;
Population > 50,000

Johnson,
1998

289

1993

McLelland
and Giroux,
2000
Johnson et al.,
2002

164

1996

U.S. cities with CAFRs
and U.S. counties
Population > 20,000
U.S. cities;
Population > 100,000

302

1993

Payne and
Jenson,
2002
Merritt,
2010
Mead,
2011

Mean Audit
Report Lag
3.56 months
(approx.
107 days)
8.13 months
(approx.
244 days)
115 days

121 days

125 days

U.S. cities with CAFRs
and U.S. counties
Population > 20,000
410 1992 Cities in eight states;
Population > 5,000 or
Expenditures > $100,000
450 2007- U.S. cities issuing bonds
250 2009 U.S. counties issuing bonds

122 days

294 2006- Largest U.S. cities
276 2008 Largest U.S. counties
130
Cities: Revenues between $10 million
and $100 million
131
Counties: Revenues between $10 million
and $100 million

182 days
172 days
187 days
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100 days

168 days
172 days

244 days

examining fiscal-year 1993 data, which addressed developments in governmental financial
reporting since the early 1980s, and it included additional variables not included in the prior
studies. Johnson (1998) examined 289 CAFRs of local governments with populations of 20,000
or more for fiscal year 1993 and extended prior research by considering additional explanatory
variables and by comparing city and county audit delay. McLelland & Giroux (2000) examined
164 cities with populations greater than 100,000 for fiscal year 1996. Johnson et al. (2002)
examined 302 cities and counties for fiscal year 1993 and provided further evidence on the effect
of seasonal variations in auditor workload on audit fees and audit delay. Payne & Jenson (2002)
examined 410 cities with populations greater than 5,000 (or expenditures greater than $100,000)
for fiscal year 1992 and investigated the effects of auditor and auditee characteristics on audit
delay. Merritt (2010) was a descriptive study of audits of 250 counties and 450 cities that issued
municipal bonds, using data from 2007 to 2009. Mead (2011) examined audits of the largest
counties and largest cities in the United States, as well as randomly selected local governments
for fiscal years 2006 to 2008. The study compared actual audit delay to survey results
concerning the usefulness of the reported information with the passage of time.

Dwyer & Wilson (1989)
Dwyer & Wilson (1989) developed and tested hypotheses related to municipal reporting
timeliness by establishing a model based, in part, on the underlying assumption that timely
reporting is one means available to municipal officials to signal above-average competence in
financial management. Three separate models were tested, each using a different dependent
variable. The dependent variables included (1) the time between fiscal year end and audit report
date (the report-time model), (2) the time between audit report date and the mailing of the
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financial statements to the state authorities (the mail-time model), and (3) the total time between
fiscal year end and the mailing date (the total-time model). Each of the regression models
included the same independent variables. The authors developed four hypotheses concerning
those variables.
The authors hypothesized an inverse relationship between favorable report message
content and municipal reporting time delay, arguing that municipal officials may have incentive
to report promptly when the message to be reported is favorable. Two proxies were used for
report message content. The first was financial viability, measured by the ratio of general fund
balance to general fund revenues. The second proxy was the type of auditor opinion. Some
support for this hypothesis was observed. Both variables were significant for the mail-time
model. Neither was significant for the report-time model or the total-time model.
The authors also hypothesized an inverse relationship between the level of municipal
officials’ competence and municipal reporting time delay. Two proxies were used to capture
professional competence. The first was an indicator variable, coded 1 if the municipality had a
professional manager-council form of government. The authors included this variable, citing
Evans & Patton (1983), arguing that city managers tend to be non-elected professional
administrators whose future may depend upon current positive recognition and that
professionally trained city managers are likely to be more competent. This variable was not
significant in any of the models. The second proxy for professional competence was
participation in the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) Certificate of
Conformance Program. This variable was significant and in the predicted direction in the reporttime model and the total-time model.
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The authors hypothesized a positive relationship between technological constraints and
timeliness of municipal financial reporting. Four proxies were used to capture technological
constraints. The first was whether the auditor completed the audit during their traditional busy
season, which the authors defined as October 31 to March 31. This variable was not significant
in any of the models. The second was whether the municipality used a private-sector auditor or a
public-sector (i.e. state) auditor. The authors argued that the use of a state auditor is often
associated with longer reporting time. This variable was significant only in the report-time
model. The third was whether the auditing firm assumed responsibility for the annual report
printing. The authors stated that when the municipality assumes responsibility for printing the
annual report, incentives to hurry or delay printing may exist depending on the type of news
contained within the report. Conversely, the auditor has no incentive to delay the printing of the
report. No significant relationship was observed concerning this variable. The fourth proxy the
authors used to capture technological constraints was the natural log of the population of the
municipality. This variable was included to capture the effects of transaction volume and
organizational complexity. This variable was not significant in any of the models.
Finally, Dwyer & Wilson hypothesized that regulatory constraints are positively related
to the timeliness of municipal financial reporting. Two proxies were used to capture regulatory
effects. The first was whether the municipality was subject to state regulation of accounting,
such as which type of accounting basis the municipality must use. Those municipalities that
were subject to state regulation of accounting were found to have a significantly increased
reporting delay, as the variable was significant in both the total-time and report-time models.
The second proxy was whether the municipality was subject to state regulation of reporting, such
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as a state-regulated reporting deadline. This variable was moderately significant (p<0.10) in the
report-time model and was found to decrease reporting delay.
In summary, Dwyer & Wilson’s findings provide evidence that a municipality’s financial
viability, a clean audit opinion, and participation in the GFOA Certificate Program may all be
associated with decreased audit report time. In contrast, some evidence is presented that use of a
state auditor rather than an independent auditor and state regulation of accounting may lead to
increased audit reporting time.

Rubin (1992)
Rubin (1992) assessed the differences in audit fees charged and the differences in audit
timeliness between state and private-sector auditors. The author used audit time as the
dependent variable, which was measured as the time between fiscal year end and the audit report
date. Ten independent variables were used, four of which were used in Dwyer & Wilson (1989)
and six that were new to that study.
The author’s main variable of interest was that of auditor type (private-sector auditor
versus state auditor). The other independent variables included (1) the natural log of population,
(2) debt per capita, (3) bond rating, (4) whether the municipality issued a Comprehensive Annual
Financial Report rather than a general purpose report, (5) the service index, (6) the number of
reports issued, (7) whether the municipality was a member of the GFOA, (8) whether the
municipality obtained the Certificate of Achievement in Financial Reporting, and (9) the type of
audit opinion. The author suggested that debt per capita and a higher bond rating may induce
faster reporting. Organization complexity, which may require more audit time, was measured by
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a service index. Reporting complexities were also measured by the number of distinct reports
the auditors prepared and whether the report was a CAFR.
Auditor type was the only significant variable Rubin observed. Private-sector auditors
were found to be associated with shorter audit reporting time. The author suggested that the
auditor-type variable may have captured a number of underlying constructs, therefore the
regression was computed again after dropping that variable from the model. Results of this
regression indicated that the attainment of the Certificate of Achievement for Financial
Reporting is associated with shorter audit reporting time. These results, as well as the finding
concerning auditor type, were consistent with the findings of Dwyer & Wilson (1989).

Johnson (1996)
Dwyer & Wilson (1989) was based on data from 1982, and Rubin (1992) was based on
data from 1986. Johnson (1996) added to the literature by considering data from fiscal year 1993
in order to address developments in governmental financial reporting since the mid-1980s. The
number of days from fiscal year end to the audit report date was used as the dependent variable.
Ten independent variables were used, including seven that had not been previously tested. Seven
hypotheses were developed based on those new variables.
The author hypothesized that Big-Six audit firms would perform a more timely audit,
since those firms can support the concentration of resources to complete an audit on an
accelerated timetable. This hypothesis was not supported. Big-Six audit firms were not found to
have completed municipal audits significantly more quickly than any other type of audit firm.
The author included as a variable the scope of the audit that was performed. The author
clarified by stating that, at management’s discretion, the auditor will opine on (1) the combined
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financial statements and the combining and individual fund statements explicitly (a “full-scope”
audit report) or (2) the combined financial statements only but assume “in relation to”
responsibility for the fair presentation of the combining and individual fund statements.
Expression of a full-scope audit was not found to be significantly related to audit delay. The
author also hypothesized that the delay in the audit is directly related to the number of
component units that exist in the municipal entity. This hypothesis also was not supported.
The author also considered whether there existed a division of responsibility between
more than one auditor. The author hypothesized that, due to the potential for problems in
coordinating efforts, municipalities for which the auditor’s report indicated a division of
responsibility with other auditors sustain a greater delay in the audit. Results of the regression
supported this hypothesis.
Dwyer & Wilson (1989) examined timeliness as it related to the traditional busy season
of the auditor. Johnson (1996) further examined this issue by redefining “busy season”. Dwyer
& Wilson (1989) defined busy season as occurring between October 31 and March 31. Johnson
(1996) considered busy season to relate to municipalities having any year end other than
September 30 and hypothesized that audit delay is less for municipalities with that year end.
Regression results supported that cities with September 30 fiscal year ends experience minimal
audit delay.
Johnson (1996) also considered the tenure of the auditor with the specific municipality
and hypothesized a negative relationship between auditor tenure and audit delay. This variable
was measured as 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, or 5 or more years. This variable was not
significant in explaining audit delay.
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Finally, the author hypothesized that audit fees per capita are related to municipal audit
delay. The author stated that since it is possible that audit delay and audit fees may be jointly
endogenous, models of audit delay and fees per capita were estimated using two-stage least
squares. The estimated models revealed that audit fees do not significantly explain delay, but
delay does significantly explain fees per capita.
Johnson (1996) used as control variables (1) the receipt of the Certificate of Achievement
for Financial Reporting, (2) the natural log of population, and (3) whether the municipality has a
city-manager form of government. Each of these variables was used in prior studies of
municipal audit timeliness. In contrast to both Dwyer & Wilson (1989) and Rubin (1992),
Johnson (1996) found that receipt of the Certificate of Achievement does not significantly
explain delay. Similar to both of these prior studies, Johnson (1996) found no significant
relationship between the natural log of population and audit delay. The city-manager variable
also was not significant as was similarly observed in the prior studies.
In summary, Johnson (1996) provided evidence that instances where there exists a
division of auditor responsibility and instances where the municipality has a year end other than
September 30 correlate with increased audit reporting time. In contrast to prior studies, Johnson
provided evidence that the receipt of the Certificate of Achievement for Financial Reporting may
not significantly correlate with audit delay.

Johnson (1998)
As a follow-up to the 1996 study, Johnson (1998) extended the work by considering
counties in addition to cities. This study also included additional explanatory variables not
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considered in prior studies. Seven independent variables were examined, two of which were new
to this study.
One variable of interest in the Johnson (1998) study was an indicator variable concerning
whether the audited entity was a city or a county. Prior studies had not considered whether delay
differs between the two types of governments. Johnson suggested that differences in
organizational characteristics may imply differential delay. The author noted that cities are
usually organized such that their various service functions are closely coordinated, and county
functions are often administered by relatively independent officials. As a result of the
comparatively uncoordinated nature of county operations, Johnson expected audit delay to be
greater for counties. Regression results supported this assumption.
A second variable of interest in the Johnson (1998) study was whether the audit fees were
based on per-hour charges rather than a fixed amount. This information was obtained through
questionnaires submitted to each governmental entity examined in the study. The author
expected that under a fixed-fee arrangement, the auditor has incentive to limit the amount of test
work to a level that would not impair profitability. In contrast, fees computed on a variable basis
would provide incentive for the auditors to perform all the audit procedures deemed necessary,
thus contributing to audit delay. Regression results provided some evidence to support this
(p<0.10).
Other variables used in Johnson (1998) were (1) whether the entity received the
Certificate for Achievement in Financial Reporting, (2) whether responsibility for the audit was
divided among more than one auditor, (3) whether the audited entity had a September 30 fiscal
year end, (4) whether the state prescribed the scope and nature of the audit, and (5) whether the
auditor was a public-sector auditor or private-sector auditor. Consistent with Dwyer & Wilson
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(1989) and Rubin (1992), but not with Johnson (1996), results of this study provided evidence
that attainment of the Certificate of Achievement for Financial Reporting is associated with
decreased audit delay. Consistent with Johnson (1996), entities with September 30 fiscal year
ends are associated with decreased audit delay, while division of auditor responsibility is
associated with increased delay. Results of this study also indicate that state-mandated audit
procedures are associated with increased audit delay, which are somewhat in contrast to the
findings of Dwyer & Wilson (1989).

McLelland & Giroux (2000)
The major contribution of McLelland & Giroux (2000) is that the study examined
municipal audit delay for large municipalities. Their research considered only municipalities
with populations greater than 100,000. The study examined 13 independent variables, three of
which had not been included in prior studies.
One variable included in McLelland & Giroux (2000) was an indicator variable
concerning whether the municipality disclosed single-audit reports in the CAFR. The authors
noted that cities could voluntarily include additional audit reports required by federal regulations
in the annual report and that inclusion of these voluntary reports would represent good news
associated with clean opinions. As such, the authors expected this variable to be associated with
more timely reporting. Regression results provided evidence to support the authors’
assumptions.
Another variable included in this study was an indicator variable concerning whether the
city had a municipal web page that included tourism, as well as general and specific information
on the city, together with a way to communicate directly with city officials. Cities in the
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research sample were considered to have a municipal web page for purposes of the study
regardless of whether budget information or financial reports were included on the web page.
The authors noted that previous research had found that organizational productivity is positively
related to IT investment, therefore they expected the existence of a municipal web page to be
associated with decreased audit reporting time. Regression results confirmed the authors’
expectations.
Since all municipalities in the sample were subject to Single Audit requirements, the
authors captured differential effects of additional federal regulations by considering the ratio of
the log of intergovernmental grants to total revenue. The authors expected cities with high grant
percentages to have additional regulatory requirements that would require additional audit time.
The authors found that higher grant percentages are significantly associated with increased audit
delay.
Additional variables used in McLelland & Giroux (2000) included (1) whether the
municipality issued a CAFR or general-purpose financial statement, (2) whether the municipality
had a professional manager and obtained the Certificate of Achievement for Financial Reporting,
(3) whether the auditor reported a clean audit opinion, (4) the municipality’s bond rating, (5) the
natural log of the city’s population, (6) the number of component units and joint ventures, (7)
whether the audit was completed by a private-sector auditor or a public-sector auditor, (8)
whether the municipality’s fiscal year end occurred between October 31 and December 31, (9)
whether the audit responsibility was shared among more than one auditor, and (10) whether the
municipality was subject to state-mandated accounting regulations. Findings for each variable
were similar to findings from prior studies with one exception. While Rubin (1992) did not find
significance concerning the preparation of a CAFR versus a general-purpose financial statement,
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McLelland & Giroux found that preparation of a CAFR was significantly associated with
decreased audit time.

Johnson et al. (2002)
Johnson et al. (2002) built upon prior studies by focusing on the government’s fiscal year
end and its effect on audit delay and audit fees. The research examined CAFRs of municipalities
with populations greater than 20,000. Eight variables were considered, one of which had not
been considered in prior studies of audit delay.
The major finding of the study, concerning audit delay, was that governments with June
and December fiscal year ends sustain equivalent and maximal audit delay, while governments
with September year ends experience minimal delay. This finding is consistent with Johnson
(1996) and Johnson (1998). Another variable, which was new to this study, was whether the
municipal finance officer was a certified public accountant (CPA). The authors found that
governments with CPAs are significantly associated with decreased audit time.
As in prior studies, Johnson et al. (2002) found that governments receiving the GFOA
Certificate of Achievement experienced significantly less audit delay. The study also found that
division of auditor responsibility, variable rather than fixed fee arrangement, and state agency
influence on the audit are all significantly associated with increased audit delay. While Johnson
(1998) found a significant increase in audit delay for the county form of government in
comparison to the city form, Johnson et al. (2002) did not find a significant relationship.
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Payne & Jenson (2002)
Payne & Jenson (2002) considered cities in eight states in the southeastern United States.
A major contribution of this study is that it was the first to consider cities with smaller
populations. The sample included cities with populations greater than 5,000 or revenues greater
than $100,000. The study also discussed whether significant influences on audit delay are
characteristics of the audit firm or of the audit client, suggesting municipalities can control the
audit-firm specific characteristics through the audit procurement process. Sixteen variables were
considered, and hypotheses were developed concerning each variable.

Several variables

examined in this study had not been considered in prior studies.
The authors first hypothesized that a city-manager form of municipal management will
reduce audit delay. McLelland & Giroux (2000) had observed this in their study. Payne &
Jenson (2002) provided some support for their hypothesis (significant at p<0.10). In their second
hypothesis, the authors expected that municipalities receiving the Certificate of Achievement
will have reduced audit delay. Consistent with prior studies, the authors found support for this
hypothesis.
A new variable considered by Payne & Jenson (2002) was whether bonded indebtedness
was present in the government being audited. Dwyer & Wilson (1989) and McLelland & Giroux
(2000) had considered bond rating, but none of the studies prior to Payne & Jenson (2002) had
considered the mere presence of bonded indebtedness, regardless of the rating. The authors
expected that the presence of debt would increase monitoring of municipal performance, and
since delayed audit reporting can increase the perception of bad news, the government officials
would have incentive to report in a more timely manner. As such, the authors expected that the
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presence of bonded indebtedness would be associated with reduced audit delay, and they found
evidence to support their expectations.
The authors next hypothesized that the presence of regulations to prohibit solicitation of
competitive bidding, the presence of municipal policies to solicit bids for multi-year
engagements, and the presence of a competitive audit procurement process will all influence
audit delay.

The authors did not make directional predictions for the three hypotheses

concerning these three variables. The results provided evidence that a state ban on solicitation or
competitive bidding was associated with increased audit delay. The other two variables were not
significant in the model.
The authors classified the next five hypotheses as being associated with characteristics of
the municipality rather than the auditor. The authors expected that large municipalities would
have increased audit delay. While prior studies measured municipality size by examining the
natural log of population, Payne & Jenson (2002) examined municipal expenditures. Each of the
prior studies found no significance regarding the association between population and audit delay.
Payne & Jenson, however, found that municipalities with larger total expenditures experience
significantly increased audit delay.
The second audit-client-specific hypothesis involved the complexity of the audit. The
authors measured this by examining whether the audit client has three or more separate funds in
the financial statements. They hypothesized that audit clients with more than three funds would
experience greater audit delay due to increased audit complexity. Their hypothesis was not
supported.
As in prior studies, the authors hypothesized that audits performed during the auditor’s
busy season will have increased audit delay. As in prior studies, the results provided evidence to
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support this hypothesis. Payne & Jenson (2002) also hypothesized that financial statements
issued with a qualified audit opinion will have increased audit delay. Prior studies had not found
that the type of audit opinion had any significant relationship with audit delay. Payne & Jenson,
however, found that a government receiving a qualified audit opinion is significantly associated
with increased audit delay.
A final audit-client-specific hypothesis Payne & Jenson (2002) examined was whether
the municipality was required to comply with the Single Audit Act. This had not been explicitly
tested in prior studies. The authors hypothesized that the additional requirements of the Single
Audit Act would lead to increased audit delay. Results provided some evidence to support this
(p<0.10).
The final five hypotheses of Payne & Jenson (2002) involved what the authors classified
as auditor-specific characteristics. These related to auditor expertise, auditor tenure, division of
auditor responsibility, the number of employees at the audit firm, and auditor size. Auditor
expertise was measured by whether the auditor performed two or more municipal audits. The
authors expected auditor expertise to be inversely related to audit delay. This hypothesis was
supported, thus providing evidence concerning a variable not previously examined in the studies
preceding Payne & Jenson (2002).
Auditor tenure with the audit client was not found to be significantly related to audit
delay. In contrast to prior studies, division of auditor responsibility was not found to be
significant in their model. The number of employees at the audit firm that performed the audit, a
variable not previously tested, was found to be significantly associated with audit delay. A
larger number of audit employees was associated with decreased audit delay. As in prior studies,
the use of a Big-Six audit firm was not found to be significantly associated with audit delay.
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Merritt Research Services (2010)
Merritt Research Services is an independent research and data provider focused on credit
information related to municipal bonds. In a 2010 study, the organization examined audits on
different municipal bond entities, spanning a three-year period from 2007 to 2009. Findings from
that study indicated that the average time spent by counties to compete their 2009 fiscal year
audits was 172.3 days. Approximately 205 counties were included in the sample for the study.
Cities were slightly faster, taking an average of 167.7 days. Approximately 450 cities were
included in the sample. The study noted that credit quality was not necessarily a factor in how
fast or slow the audit was completed, however, weaker or more distressed credits were often
found to be on the list of late audits.

Mead (2011)
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board issued a Research Brief addressing how
long it takes governments to issue financial reports prepared in conformity with GAAP and how
the passage of time affects the usefulness of financial report information for decision making.
The GASB reviewed financial reports for fiscal years 2006-2008 of the 100 largest counties
(based on population) and the 100 largest localities and 50 randomly selected smaller county
governments (ranging from $10 million to $100 million in annual revenues) and 50 smaller city
governments. While all prior studies measured audit report delay as the time between the fiscal
year end and the date of the auditor’s report, the Mead (2011) study measures delay as the time
between fiscal year end and the date of the letter of transmittal.
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Results from the study indicated that the mean audit delay for all counties in the sample
was 243.89 days, while the mean audit delay for localities was 187.06 days. A comparison of
large counties to small counties provided evidence that smaller counties experience a greater
audit delay, with larger counties experiencing a mean of 172.17 days versus 243.89 days for
smaller counties. A comparison of larger and smaller localities indicated a slightly greater
amount of delay for smaller localities (187.06 days) versus larger localities (181.70 days).
In addition to gathering data concerning report timing, the GASB also surveyed users of
governmental financial information (bond analysts, citizen/taxpayer groups, and
legislative/oversight staff) concerning the usefulness of the financial information with the
passage of time. Findings showed that the passage of time diminishes the usefulness of financial
information. While 88 percent of respondents considered information received within 45 days of
fiscal year end to be “very useful”, the proportion was halved to 43 percent for information
received within three months. Less than nine percent of respondents considered information
received within six months to be “very useful”. Over half of the respondents considered
information received after 12 months to be “not useful at all”.

Significant Variables from Prior Research of Audit Delay in Local Governments
The studies included in the literature review each used OLS regression to determine the
effect of several explanatory variables on audit report delay. They also used a wide variety of
data from large cities and counties and entities issuing bonds to small cities and counties. Table
2 summarizes the variables found in those studies to be significantly associated with audit report
delay. The current study differs from those reviewed in that it considers all counties and cities in
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a specific state, regardless of size characteristics and other limiting characteristics, such as
issuance of bonds or reporting using a CAFR.

Table 2: Variables Prior Studies Have Shown to be Significantly Associated
with Audit Delay
Decreases
Audit Delay
Receipt of GFOA Certificate of Achievement

Increases
Audit Delay
Audit responsibility divided among two

for Excellence in Financial Reporting a, b, d, e, f, g
Preparation of CAFR rather than

or more auditors c, d, e, f
Municipal year end coincides with

general purpose financial statements e, g
Government finance officer is a certified

auditor's busy season c, d, f, g
Variable rather than fixed fee

public accountant f
Auditor is experienced in governmental

arrangement with auditor f
Large amount of municipal expenditures

audits g
City-form of government rather than

for the fiscal year g
Presence of state-mandated accounting

other form of government d
Larger number of employees at audit firm

or auditing requirements a, d
State ban on solicitation or competitive

that performs the audit g

bidding for audit engagements g

Presence of bonded indebtedness g

Use of public-sector (state) auditor rather
than private-sector auditor a, b, e

Governmental entity has a web page e

Total revenue is made up of a larger portion
of intergovernmental revenue e
Auditor issued a qualified audit opinion g

Governmental entity voluntarily includes
additional reports e
a

Dwyer & Wilson (1989)
Rubin (1992)
c
Johnson (1996)
d
Johnson (1998)
e
McLelland & Giroux (2000)
f
Johnson et al. (2002)
g
Payne & Jenson (2002)
b
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Prior Research of Audit Delay in School Districts
Also pertinent to this research are the findings of Carslaw et al. (2007) in a study of audit
delay in school districts. In that study, the authors examined results from 36,367 audits during
the five-year period from 1998 to 2002. The authors noted an average audit delay of anywhere
from 245 days to 432 days in the five years analyzed and also noted that the percent of late filers
ranged from 9.7 percent to 15.6 percent.
In all five years examined, the authors noted that audit delay was positively associated
with the level of expenditures for the year. Other variables that were found to have significantly
increased audit delay in all five years of the study include the use of a sole-practitioner auditor
rather than a larger firm, the presence of reportable conditions in the audit report, and the
presence of material noncompliance in the audit report. The authors also noted that the use of a
private-sector auditor rather than the use of a state auditor was associated with decreased audit
delay in all five years analyzed in the study.
In four of the five years studied, the authors found that an audit report with an unqualified
audit opinion was associated with decreased audit delay. In three of the five years examined,
receipt of the GFOA certificate of achievement, the auditor’s experience in similar audit
engagements, and the classification of the audit client as a low-risk client, were all significantly
associated with decreased audit delay.
The study also focused attention on the effects of the results of the Single Audits on audit
delay. In three of the five years, the issuance of an unqualified opinion on the report of major
programs was found to be significantly related to a decrease in audit delay. The remainder of the
findings was mixed. The presence of questioned costs on the audit report significantly increased
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audit delay in one of the years, while it significantly decreased audit delay in another year. A
similar result was noted regarding the presence of reportable conditions in a major program.

Prior Research of Audit Delay in For-Profit Entities
Researchers have been examining audit delay in for-profit companies since as early as the
1970s. Because of the differing characteristics between for-profit companies versus
governmental entities, many of the findings from these studies are not applicable to a study of
audit delay in governments. Some findings from prior studies of audit delay in for-profit
companies that are relevant to this study are discussed below.
The most consistent finding among the prior studies is that the size of the company is
negatively associated with audit delay. It could be reasoned that larger clients require more audit
work as a result of complexity and a comparably higher number of transactions. It could also,
however, be expected that these larger companies would have more in-house expertise and better
internal controls, which would result in a reduction of audit work (Newton & Ashton, 1989). At
least 11 prior studies of audit delay (Courtis, 1976; Davies & Whittred, 1980; Givoly & Palmon,
1982; Newton & Ashton, 1989; Ashton et al., 1989; Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; Bamber et al.,
1993; Ng & Tai, 1994; Schwartz & Soo, 1996; Jaggi & Tsui, 1999; Owusu-Ansah, 2000) found
that larger companies (often measured by total assets or by total revenues) have a shorter audit
delay. This finding is also consistent with the idea that larger companies have a greater incentive
for timely disclosure of results, as these companies face greater external pressure to report
earnings quickly (Newton & Ashton, 1989; Bamber et al., 1993). Of particular importance is the
finding from Ashton et al. (1989) that larger, publicly traded companies are associated with
significantly shorter audit delay, while larger, non-public companies are associated with
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significantly longer audit delay. This result suggests that incentive for timely disclosure is an
underlying factor regarding the association of entity size with audit delay.
Audit-delay research in for-profit companies has also yielded important information
regarding the effect of profitability measures on the length of time to completion of the audit.
Findings from prior studies appear to confirm that the reporting of bad news tends to be delayed,
while the reporting of favorable news tends to be accelerated (Givoly & Palmon, 1982;
Chambers & Penman, 1984; Atiase et al. 1989). Ashton et al. (1989), Bamber et al. (1993),
Schwartz & Soo (1996), Henderson & Kaplan (2000), and Krishnan (2005) all found that a
company with a loss before extraordinary items was significantly more likely to be associated
with increased audit delay, and Courtis (1976) found that as a company’s profitability increases,
audit delay decreases. Similarly, Newton & Ashton (1989) and Ng & Tai (1994) each found that
an increased percentage change in earnings from the previous year leads to a decrease in audit
delay. Bamber et al. (1993), in examining both audit report delay and earnings announcement
delay, found that an increased percentage change in earnings from the previous year did not lead
to decreased audit delay but did lead to decreased delay in earnings announcement. This finding
provides strong evidence that companies wish to speed up the reporting of favorable news.
Prior studies examined not only the effects of measures of company profitability, but also
the effects of measures of financial condition. Bamber et al. (1993) computed a financial
condition index which measures a company’s probability of bankruptcy. Findings indicated that
as the probability of bankruptcy increased, the audit delay also increased. Henderson & Kaplan
(2000) also found that as the probability of bankruptcy increased, so did the audit report delay.
Davies & Whittred (1980) determined that a higher ratio of debt to total assets was associated
with increased audit delay.
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Another area of focus for prior studies of audit delay in for-profit companies is that of
various complexities that may be inherent in a particular audit or may arise during the course of
an audit. At least six prior studies (Newton & Ashton, 1989; Ashton et al., 1989; Bamber et al.,
1993; Schwartz & Soo, 1996; Laitinen & Laitinen, 1998; and Henderson & Kaplan, 2000) all
found that increased audit delay occurs with the presence of extraordinary items on the audit
client’s financial statements. Ng & Tai (1994) and Jaggi & Tsui (1999) found that an increased
number of company subsidiaries was followed by an increase in audit delay. Ashton et al.
(1989) found that audit delay increased for companies with a greater number of reported
contingencies, and Henderson & Kaplan (2000) noted that audit delay increased for companies
with uncertainties cited in the audit report.
Research has also examined the effect of a certain type of audit opinion on the ultimate
delay of the audit report. While Ashton et al. (1989) found that the issuance of a qualified audit
opinion leads to decreased audit delay, other studies (Bamber et al., 1993; Schwartz & Soo,
1996; Jaggi & Tsui, 1999; and Soltani, 2002) have found the opposite. Schwartz & Soo (1996)
found that an audit report with a going-concern explanatory paragraph was associated with
longer audit delay.
While the characteristics of for-profit entities differ from those of governmental entities,
some of the findings from prior research of corporate audit delay are used to guide the
hypotheses of this study of governmental audit delay. The finding concerning a company’s
desire to accelerate the reporting of good news and delay the reporting of bad news particularly
helps guide some of the hypotheses in this study regarding report message content. Research
Question 1 in this study deals with whether the financial report message, as evidenced by key
financial statement ratios, is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports
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meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. Since this area has not been
examined in prior studies of governmental audit delay, it was necessary to look to the findings
from corporate audit delay to guide the hypotheses in this study regarding the effect of
profitability ratios and financial-position ratios on the timing of the audit. Also, the findings
from studies of corporate audit delay regarding the effect of various complexities on the timing
of the audit are also considered when developing the hypotheses regarding the audit environment
in this study.
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CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY
This research examines the variables that impact delay in audits of local governments in
Mississippi, as well as the variables that differ between local governments that file audits within
the state-mandated deadlines versus those governments that fail to do so. The research also
examines the variables that impact delay in compilation reports issued by smaller local
governments that are not required to complete full-scope audits, as well as the variables that
differ between local governments that file compilations within the state-mandated deadlines
versus those governments that fail to do so.
This research defines audit/compilation delay (DELAY) as the number of days from
fiscal year end (September 30, 2007 for all observations in this study) to the date the audit or
compilation report was filed with the Mississippi Office of the State Auditor.4 This definition of
audit delay differs from prior studies of governmental audit delay as discussed in Chapter II in
that those studies, with the exception of Dwyer & Wilson (1989) and Mead (2011), measured
audit delay as the time between the fiscal year end and the date on the audit report. The filing
date, rather than the report date, is used in this study, because it better represents the time in
which the reports are publicly available.
This research defines a late audit/compilation (LATE) as one that is submitted to the
Office of the State Auditor on a date beyond the state-mandated audit deadline. In this study,
audits that are filed late are coded “1”, while on-time audits are coded “0”. Concerning the statemandated audit deadline, Section 21-35-31 (1) of the Mississippi Code requires all municipalities
to have an annual audit or compilation. According to the Code, the procedures shall be
4

This variable is log transformed for analysis.
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completed and the reports be submitted to the state auditor’s office before the close of the next
succeeding fiscal year. As such, the audit deadline and, therefore, the cutoff date between a late
audit or compilation and a timely audit or compilation is defined in this research as September
30, 2008.
This research utilizes OLS regression to identify the statistically significant variables that
can be used to predict governmental audit/compilation delay, and it uses logistic regression to
identify the statistically significant variables that differ between entities that file audits or
compilations in a timely manner versus those entities that do not file in a timely manner. In this
study, report timeliness is modeled on the following factors: 1) Report message content and
managerial competency, 2) Accountability, and 3) Audit environment. Specifically, the research
addresses the following research questions concerning the effect those factors have on the
completion of full-scope audits:

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
1)

Is the financial report message, as evidenced by key financial
statement ratios, a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

2)

Is the total number of reported audit findings a significant predictor of (a) audit
report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing
deadlines?
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3)

Is a qualified or adverse audit opinion a significant predictor of (a) audit
report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing
deadlines?

Accountability:
4)

Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor
of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet statemandated filing deadlines?

5)

Is the earlier filing deadline required under the Single Audit Act a significant
predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet
state-mandated filing deadlines?

Audit Environment:
6)

Is the number of major funds reported in the government’s financial
statements a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

7)

Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s office a
significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?
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8)

Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

Regarding compilation engagements for smaller governments, the research addresses the
following questions:

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
9)

Is the total number of reported findings a significant predictor of (a) compilation
report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated
filing deadlines?

Accountability:
10)

Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor
of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to
meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

Audit Environment:
11)

Is the number of funds reported in the government’s financial
statements a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b)
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

49

12)

Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the compilation client’s
office a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

13)

Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b)
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

Hypothesis Development
The current study proposes that audit/compilation timeliness is a function of three groups
of factors, as shown in the following model:

Audit/Compilation delay =

ƒ (Report message content and managerial competency,
Accountability, Audit environment)

Prior studies of governmental audit delay have also considered regulatory constraints.
Due to the nature of the sample used in this study (observations from only one state), regulatory
constraints will be equal across all observations. Therefore, many of the variables found to be
significant in prior studies are controlled for by the use of data from only one state. For example,
Johnson (1996), Johnson (1998), Johnson et al. (2002), and Payne & Jenson (2002) all found that
governmental entities with a fiscal year-end falling within the researchers’ defined “busy season”
were associated with increased audit delay. All governmental entities in Mississippi have a
September 30 year end, therefore a control variable to capture year-end differences is not
included in the regression models for this study.
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Johnson et al. (2002) found that a variable fee arrangement based on a per-hour charge
was associated with increased audit delay when compared with audit engagements with a fixed
fee arrangement. In Mississippi, a variable fee arrangement exists with the total fee not allowed
to exceed a contracted fixed amount. Since all observations in the sample for this study are
subject to the same type of fee arrangement, a control variable to capture the type of fee
arrangement is not included in the regression models for this study.
Payne & Jenson (2002) found that the presence of a state ban on solicitation or
competitive bidding for audit engagements ultimately leads to increased audit delay. As no such
ban exists in Mississippi, all observations in the sample for this study will be equal for this
variable. As such, a control variable to capture differences in state policies regarding solicitation
or competitive bidding for audit engagements is not included in the regression models in this
study.
Finally, Dwyer & Wilson (1989) and McLelland & Giroux (2000) each found that the
presence of state-mandated accounting requirements can impact audit timeliness. Dwyer &
Wilson (1989) found that if a state was subject to state regulation of accounting, such as when a
state requires an accounting basis other than that required by GAAP, this is associated with
increased audit delay. Similarly, McLelland & Giroux (2000) found that the presence of state
accounting regulations increased audit report delay. In Mississippi, the accounting requirements,
and thus the auditing requirements, depend on the amount of municipal revenues or
expenditures.
According to the state’s municipal audit guide, Mississippi municipal governments may
contract for one of three different types of engagements: (1) Full-scope audit of financial
statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, (2) Full-scope audit of financial statements
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prepared in accordance with Other Comprehensive Basis of Accounting (OCBOA) (i.e. Cash
Basis), or (3) The preparation of a compilation report using OCBOA (Cash Basis) after applying
certain agreed-upon procedures.
The criteria to determine the type of attestation engagement is based on total revenues or
expenditures, whichever is greater. All municipalities with revenues or expenditures greater than
or equal to $10 million are required to have a full-scope audit of financial statements prepared in
accordance with GAAP and report in accordance with GASB Statement No. 34. All
municipalities with total revenues or expenditures greater than or equal to $1 million but less
than $10 million are required to have a full-scope audit of their Combined Statement of Cash
Receipts and Disbursements and report in accordance with GASB Statement No. 34.
Municipalities with revenues or expenditures less than $1 million may contract for a compilation
report in lieu of a full-scope audit of financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP.
Since the single audit package that must be submitted to the Federal Audit Clearinghouse
requires audited financial statements, the option for a compilation report is not available if the
municipality is required to have a federal single audit.
Since all the observations in this study are subject to the same regulatory constraints, a
control variable to capture differences in state regulations is not included in the regression
models. However, since each of the report choices will require differing amounts of auditor
effort and the auditor’s output will differ between the two types of engagements, separate
regression models are completed for full-scope audits and for compilation reports/agreed-upon
procedures engagements. Due to the small number of Mississippi municipalities having fullscope audits of financial statements that are prepared in accordance with OCBOA, separate
regressions are not completed for those engagements. Furthermore, since the characteristics of
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those engagements differ from the characteristics of either a full-scope-audit engagement or a
compilation engagement, those entities are not included in the regression models in this study.

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
Dwyer & Wilson (1989) developed hypotheses based on the premise that timely reporting
is a device employed by municipalities to signal highly competent financial management.
Administrators and elected officials are expected to signal fiscal competence and stewardship to
the citizens, investors, and other users (McLelland & Giroux 2000). One circumstance in which
management has incentive to signal competent performance is when there exists a favorable
message to be reported. One element of a favorable message is strong financial performance.
Givoly & Palmon (1982) noted that delayed financial reporting is often a precursor to the receipt
of bad news. Hirshleifer (1993) suggested that managers’ incentives are to advance the arrival of
good news and delay the arrival of bad news.
Dwyer & Wilson (1989) proxied strong financial performance with a measure of
financial viability (the ratio of the general fund balance to general fund revenues). The ratio of
general fund balance to general fund revenues is a widely used indicator of operating fund
liquidity (Dwyer & Wilson 1989). In the prior studies of municipal audit timeliness, this is the
only ratio that has thus far been examined, and the researchers did not find evidence that it was
significantly associated with audit delay. The current study proposes to examine other key
governmental financial statement ratios as suggested by Pridgen & Wilder (2011) to be relevant
indicators of underlying debt ratings. Those ratios include the following:
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(1) Total Net Assets / Total Revenues
(2) Change In Net Assets / Total Net Assets

Equation (1) is a measure of financial position (POSITION). It measures the extent to
which cumulative revenues exceed cumulative costs. Equation (2) is a measure of financial
performance (PERFORMANCE) that measures how much of the current year’s surplus or deficit
contributed to the cumulative net assets. These two key financial ratios provide a measure of
favorable or unfavorable report content. It is expected that favorable report content (good news)
will be reported in a more timely manner. This effect is expected for two reasons. First,
management has a signaling incentive to report good news as quickly as possible, as report
delay, itself, may be interpreted as a signal of bad news. Also, favorable report content is an
indication of competent management. A competent management staff is expected to have
stronger internal controls and a more extensive and well-organized record-keeping function.
These characteristics will aid the audit process, have a positive impact on the auditor’s
assessment of risk, and contribute to a more timely audit. In contrast, it is expected that the
reporting of unfavorable content (bad news) will be delayed and will also be associated with less
competent management. A less competent management staff can be reasonably expected to have
weaker internal controls and a less extensive and more unorganized record-keeping function.
These characteristics will hinder the audit process, have a negative impact on the auditor’s
assessment of risk, and contribute to a less timely overall audit. Based on these arguments, the
following are hypothesized:
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H1a: A favorable report message, as measured by key financial statement ratios, will be
negatively associated with audit report delay.

H1b: A favorable report message, as measured by key financial statement ratios, will be
associated with audit reports meeting state-mandated filing deadlines.

Another element of a favorable governmental audit report message is the lack of audit
findings. Prior studies of governmental audit timeliness have not addressed audit findings. In a
study of differences between private-sector auditors and public-sector (state government)
auditors in Mississippi, Cagle & Pridgen (2011) noted that the number of audit findings issued in
the audit report is positively associated with audit delay. Audit findings are issued when the
auditee fails to comply with laws or regulations and when the auditor notes problems with
internal controls. These issues, especially internal control problems, will lead to increased
assessment of risk, increased audit procedures, and increased audit time. In contrast, the lack of
audit findings, like favorable financial statement ratios, is a measure of good news that is
expected to be reported in a more timely manner. Lack of audit findings may also be considered
an indication of competent management. In contrast, a large number of audit findings could be
perceived as bad news and could be an indication of less competent management, both of which
could lead to less timely reporting. In this study, FINDINGS is defined as the total number of
findings issued by the auditor on the audit report. The following are hypothesized:

H2a: The total number of reported audit findings will be positively associated with audit
report delay.
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H2b: A higher number of reported audit findings will be will be associated with audit
reports failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.

Although prior studies (Dwyer & Wilson 1989, Rubin 1992, McLelland & Giroux 2000)
have found no significant relationship between the type of audit opinion and audit timeliness,
Payne & Jenson (2002) found that unqualified audit opinions were significantly associated with
decreased audit time. Also, Laitinen & Laitinen (1998) found a significant association between
qualified audit reports and timeliness of filing by commercial entities. Bamber et al. (1993)
suggests that qualified opinions are not likely to be issued until after the auditor has spent
considerable time and effort pursuing additional audit procedures and other reporting alternatives
in an effort to avoid qualification. In this study, the variable OPINION is coded 1 if the
government entity received an other-than-unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise. Taking
into consideration the findings of Payne & Jenson (2002) and Laitinen & Laitinen (1998) and
that suggested by Bamber et al. (1993), the following are hypothesized:

H3a: An other-than-unqualified audit opinion will be associated with increased audit
report delay.

H3b: An other-than-unqualified audit opinion will be associated with audit reports failing
to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.
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The government’s receipt of the GFOA Certificate for Excellence in Financial Reporting,
a variable included and found to be significant in most of the prior studies on governmental audit
delay, is not included in this study. Evans & Patton (1983) noted that larger cities are more
likely to participate in this award program, and Payne & Jenson (2002) noted that, of the states
sampled in that study, Mississippi was the least likely to participate in the Certificate program.
In the year sampled for this study, only five municipalities in Mississippi (Biloxi, Clinton,
Jackson, Meridian, and Ridgeland) received the Certificate. These five cities are retained in the
model, but, as a sensitivity check, a separate regression was calculated after removing these
cities.
Preparation of a comprehensive annual financial report (CAFR) rather than generalpurpose financial statements will also not be considered in this study, as only ten counties and
cities in Mississippi prepared a CAFR. Also, a city-manager form of government versus another
form of government is not considered in this study, as only six entities (D’Iberville, Gautier,
Grenada, Pascagoula, Pearl River, Picayune) in Mississippi were noted as having a city-manager
form. As with the cities awarded the Certificate for Excellence, those cities preparing CAFRs
and those cities with a city-manager form of government are retained in the model, but, as a
sensitivity check, separate regressions were computed after removing these entities.

Accountability:
Differing levels of accountability may also influence the timing of the audit report. For
example, the presence of debt is expected to increase monitoring of municipal performance
(Evans & Patton 1987). Bondholders’ primary concerns are the solvency of the municipality and
its ability to repay the required debt service (Payne & Jenson 2002). Payne & Jenson (2002)
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noted that bondholders would view an unusual delay in financial reporting as a negative sign. As
such, management of entities in which bonded and other long-term indebtedness exist will have
an incentive to signal favorable performance through timely reporting. Payne & Jenson (2002)
found that the presence of bonded indebtedness significantly reduced audit delay. In this study,
the DEBT variable is measured as the total dollar amount of long-term debt at fiscal year end.
The following are hypothesized:

H4a: The amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness will be negatively associated
with audit report delay.

H4b: A higher amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness will be associated with
audit reports meeting state-mandated filing deadlines.

Payne & Jenson (2002) also included a variable capturing whether the government
reported in accordance with the requirements of the Single Audit Act. Governments expending
$500,000 or greater of Federal assistance in a single year are subject to additional audit
procedures under the Single Audit Act. These additional procedures will increase audit time, and
additional audit reports will necessarily be generated. The single audit reporting package, which
must be submitted to the Federal Audit Clearinghouse, includes not only the audited financial
statements, but also a schedule of expenditures of federal awards, the auditor’s opinion on the
fair presentation of the schedule of federal expenditures of awards, an auditor’s report on internal
control findings and an opinion on compliance pertaining to major programs, an auditor’s
schedule of findings and questioned costs, a summary schedule of prior audit findings, a
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summary of planned and completed corrective actions regarding those findings, and a data
collection form summarizing the results of each audit (Carslaw et al. 2007). Payne & Jenson
(2002) found a marginally significant positive association between the existence of a Single
Audit and audit delay.
Although Single Audits lead to additional audit requirements and time, entities subject to
those requirements are also subject to additional filing deadlines by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). Specifically, the single audit reporting package must be submitted no later
than nine months after the end of the auditee’s fiscal year. In this study, the SINGLEAUDIT
variable is coded 1 if the government is subject to the requirements of the Single Audit Act, and
0 otherwise. As a result of the additional level of accountability and the Single Audit filing
deadline occurring earlier than Mississippi’s state-mandated filing deadline, the following are
hypothesized:

H5a: Governmental entities subject to the Single Audit Act will be associated with
decreased audit report delay.

H5b: Governmental entities subject to the Single Audit Act will be associated with audit
reports meeting state-mandated filing deadlines.

Audit Environment:
The various complexities of an audit can lead to potential delays in the timing of the audit
report. Payne & Jenson (2002) used as a measure of audit complexity the number of separate
funds reported on the government’s financial statements. The variable was coded 1 for any
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entity that reported three or more separate funds and 0 if otherwise. Approximately 81 percent
of the observations in that study reported three or more separate funds, and the findings indicated
no significant correlation with audit timing. Since that study, the enactment of GASB Statement
No. 34 changed the method of reporting individual funds. Current rules require reporting only
“major funds” separately rather than reporting all funds separately. Major funds include the
general fund and any other fund in which total assets, liabilities, revenues, or
expenditures/expenses of the fund are at least 10 percent of the total of all funds of its category
(governmental or enterprise) and at least 5 percent of the total for all governmental and
enterprise funds combined. All non-major funds are allowed to be combined and reported in a
single column.
In the current study, a variable, FUNDS, is included to capture the number of reported
major funds. As a greater number of major funds will require a greater amount of audit effort,
the following are hypothesized:

H6a: The total number of reported major funds will be positively associated with audit
delay.

H6b: A higher number of reported major funds will be associated with audit reports failing
to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.

The physical distance between the auditor’s office and the auditee’s office is a variable
not considered in prior studies. While the distance between the auditor and client is not a direct
measure of audit complexity, the mileage the auditors must travel to complete field work can be
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reasonably expected to have a bearing on the amount of time required to complete the audit. An
auditor situated farther from the audit client will require additional travel time that an auditor
situated nearer to the client would not be required to incur. Additionally, auditors may be
inclined to procrastinate concerning engagements in which the burden of increased travel is
present, especially when there exist other engagements that are closer in proximity. In this study,
the DISTANCE variable is defined as the total number of miles between the auditor’s office and
the auditee’s office. The following are hypothesized:

H7a: The total number of miles between the auditor and the audit client will be positively
associated with audit report delay.

H7b: A higher number of miles between the auditor and the audit client will be associated
with audit reports failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.

An audit of governmental entities differs from an audit of for-profit companies.
Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), issued by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), apply to financial and performance audits of governmental
agencies. As such, a degree of specialization is required to perform governmental audits. In this
study, the variable, EXPERTISE, is measured as the total number of governmental audit and
compilation clients for each audit firm in the sample. Audit firms that specialize in audits and
compilations of governmental entities are expected to be better equipped to perform a timely
audit or compilation of a local governmental entity. However, since all governmental
engagements in Mississippi are due on the same date, auditors with multiple governmental
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clients may experience time constraints as a result of increased workload. As such, no direction
is predicted regarding the following hypotheses:

H8a: The total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the audit
firm will be associated with audit delay.

H8b: The total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the audit
firm will be associated with whether audit reports meet state-mandated filing deadlines.

Control Variable:
The data obtained for this study includes audits of both counties and municipalities. Each
of the report choices will require differing amounts of auditor effort. County audits are expected
to differ from municipal audits in the organization of operations and the degree of audit
complexity. Johnson (1998) included a categorical variable for counties and found that counties
were significantly associated with longer audit delays when compared with municipalities. It is
expected that counties in the sample from this study will have longer audit delays when
compared with municipalities, therefore the full-scope-audit regression model will include a
control variable (COUNTY) coded 1 if the entity is a county and 0 if otherwise. This variable is
used to control for the potential effect of organizational differences on the time to file the audit.

62

Compilation Engagements
As previously mentioned, smaller municipalities in Mississippi are allowed to submit a
compilation report to the state auditor in lieu of a full-scope audit report. The auditors of those
entities are only required to complete certain limited agreed-upon procedures. As such, many of
the hypotheses outlined above will not be applicable to those engagements. The compiled
financial statements, for example, are limited to a statement of cash receipts and disbursements,
therefore key financial ratios based on accrual accounting cannot be extracted from those
statements. Also, the auditor expresses no opinion concerning the fair presentation of financial
information. Finally, municipalities required to file according to the Single Audit Act must also
complete a full-scope audit. Based on the discussions from this chapter, the following are
hypothesized with respect to these limited-scope engagements:

H9a: The total number of reported findings will be positively associated with compilation
report delay.
H9b: A higher number of reported findings will be associated with compilation reports
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.

H10a: The amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness will be negatively
associated with compilation report delay.
H10b: A higher amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness will be associated
with compilation reports meeting state-mandated filing deadlines.
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H11a: The total number of reported funds will be positively associated with compilation
report delay.
H11b: A higher number of reported funds will be associated with compilation reports
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.

H12a: The total number of miles between the auditor and the compilation client will be
positively associated with compilation report delay.
H12b: A higher number of miles between the auditor and the compilation client will be
associated with compilation reports failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines.

H13a: The total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the audit
firm will be associated with compilation report delay.
H13b: The total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the audit
firm will be associated with whether compilation reports meet state-mandated filing
deadlines.

Empirical Models
Ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression and logistic regression is used to test hypotheses
in this study. The dependent variable, DELAY, is used to test the set of hypotheses dealing with
report delay (the A-set of hypotheses). That variable is defined as the number of days from the
entity’s fiscal year end (September 30, 2007) to the date the audit or compilation report was
received by the Mississippi Office of the State Auditor, and is log transformed for analysis, as
visual inspection of the residual distribution using untransformed data revealed a violation of the
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normality assumption. The following OLS regression model is used for tests of full-scope audit
engagements:

DELAY = ƒ (POSITION, PERFORMANCE, FINDINGS, OPINION, DEBT, SINGLEAUDIT,
FUNDS, DISTANCE, EXPERTISE, COUNTY)

The majority of the data used in the study was obtained from the audited and compiled
financial reports of each county and municipality. The variable names, expected impact on audit
delay, and variable descriptions have been previously discussed. Table 3 presents a summary of
the variables along with sources of data.
The dependent variable, LATE, was used to test those hypotheses dealing with whether
the governmental entity met or failed to meet the reporting deadlines (the B-set of hypotheses).
That variable is coded 1 if the audit is filed beyond the state-mandated filing deadline and 0 if the
audit is filed on or before the state-mandated filing deadline. The following logistic regression is
used for full-scope audit engagements:

LATE = ƒ (POSITION, PERFORMANCE, FINDINGS, OPINION, DEBT, SINGLEAUDIT,
FUNDS, DISTANCE, EXPERTISE, COUNTY)

Many of the local governments in Mississippi are not required to have a full-scope audit
and instead contract for a compilation report subject to certain agreed-upon procedures to be
performed by the auditor. These procedures typically involve a reconciliation of cash on deposit
with banks to balances in the general ledger accounts, confirmation of cash balances from the
banks, verification of taxes on real and personal property levied during the year, verification of a
sample of purchases made by the municipality during the year, and verification of the deposit of
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Table 3: Description of Variables
Variable
(Expected Sign)
Description
Dependent Variables:
DELAY
Number of days from fiscal year
end to the date the audit report is
received by the state auditor's office
LATE

Source
Audited Financial Statements

=1 if the entity failed to meet
the state-mandated reporting
deadline, 0 otherwise
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION (-)
Total Net Assets/Total Revenues

Audited Financial Statements

PERFORMANCE (-)

Change in Net Assets/Total Net Assets

Audited Financial Statements

FINDINGS (+)

Total number of audit findings
issued by the auditor

Audited Financial Statements

OPINION (+)

=1 if entity received other than
unqualified audit opinion, 0 otherwise

Audited Financial Statements

Government's total long-term debt

Audited Financial Statements

=1 if the entity is subject to the
requirements of a Single Audit, 0 otherwise

Audited Financial Statements

Accountability:
DEBT (-)
SINGLEAUDIT (-)

Audited Financial Statements

Audit Environment:
FUNDS (+)
Number of major funds reported on
the entity's financial statements

Audited Financial Statements

DISTANCE (+)

Number of miles between auditor's
office and the audit client's office

mapquest.com

EXPERTISE (±)

Total number of governmental attestation
engagements performed by the
audit firm during the year

Compiled from Audited
Financial Statements

=1 if audited entity is a county, 0 otherwise

Audited Financial Statements

Control Variable:
COUNTY (±)
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payments made by the state to the municipality during the year. These engagements are subject
to the same due date as are full-scope audits.
Since the procedures outlined above do not constitute an audit, many of the variables
captured in the regression model for full-scope audits do not exist for these compilation
engagements. However, to gain a better understanding of the timing of these engagements, the
following models were examined (See Table 3 for variable descriptions):

DELAY = ƒ (FINDINGS, DEBT, FUNDS, DISTANCE, EXPERTISE)
LATE = ƒ (FINDINGS, DEBT, FUNDS, DISTANCE, EXPERTISE)
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CHAPTER IV – RESULTS
This research examines audit delay and compilation delay in local governments in
Mississippi. It utilizes ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test whether certain
independent variables have an effect on the length of time between the fiscal year-end and the
date in which the final audited or compiled report is submitted to the Office of the State Auditor.
The research also utilizes logistic regression to test whether certain independent variables are
associated with whether audited or compiled financial statements are submitted to the Office of
the State Auditor within the state-mandated timeframe of one year.
Independent variables examined in this study are grouped into three categories: (1)
Report Content and Managerial Competency, (2) Accountability, and (3) Audit Environment.
This chapter discusses the findings concerning the following research questions concerning
governmental entities required to obtain a full-scope audit of its financial statements:

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
1)

Is the financial report message, as evidenced by key financial
statement ratios, a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

2)

Is the total number of reported audit findings a significant predictor of (a) audit
report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing
deadlines?
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3)

Is a qualified or adverse audit opinion a significant predictor of (a) audit
report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing
deadlines?

Accountability:
4)

Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor
of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet statemandated filing deadlines?

5)

Is the earlier filing deadline required under the Single Audit Act a significant
predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or failing to meet
state-mandated filing deadlines?

Audit Environment:
6)

Is the number of major funds reported in the government’s financial
statements a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

7)

Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s office a
significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports meeting or
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

8)

Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) audit report delay and (b) audit reports
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?
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Regarding smaller governments that are allowed to complete a compilation engagement,
this chapter discusses the findings concerning the following research questions:

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
9)

Is the total number of reported findings a significant predictor of (a) compilation
report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to meet statemandated filing deadlines?

Accountability:
10)

Is the amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant predictor
of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to
meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

Audit Environment:
11)

Is the number of funds reported in the government’s financial
statements a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b)
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

12)

Is the number of miles between the auditor’s office and the compilation client’s
office a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?
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13)

Is the total number of governmental attestation engagements performed by the
audit firm a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b)
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

The Sample
The data used to examine governmental audit and compilation delay were obtained from
the audited and compiled financial statements of Mississippi governments for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2007. Fiscal-year 2007 was chosen to ensure that the governments taking
the longest to file audited or compiled financial statements would be included in the sample. The
final sample included entities filing as late as December 22, 2010.
A listing of Mississippi counties and municipalities was obtained which contained an
initial sample of 82 observations and 298 observations, respectively. Financial statements were
obtained for each municipality and county either from the website of the Mississippi Office of
the State Auditor or directly from that office when financial statements were not present on the
website. For Mississippi counties, the final sample included 55 observations, as one was
removed from the sample since a final audit had not yet been completed for fiscal year 2007, and
26 were removed from the sample since these audits were completed by the Mississippi Office of
the State Auditor rather than by a private accounting firm.
For the 298 Mississippi municipalities, 22 of the entities were removed from the final
sample because audited or compiled financial statements were not available as of the date of data
collection. Another 30 municipalities were not included in the final sample because the audited
financial statements of those entities were prepared using an other comprehensive basis of
accounting rather than GAAP and, therefore, lacked comparability on some of the variables,
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particularly the financial statement ratio variables. One municipality was removed from the
sample because of outlying data.5 This resulted in a final sample that included 111
municipalities submitting audited financial statements and 134 municipalities submitting
compiled financial statements.

Descriptive Information—Full-Scope Audit Engagements
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for full-scope audits filed on or before the statemandated deadline and full-scope audits filed after the state-mandated deadline. Along with
statistics for all 166 governmental entities in the sample (55 counties and 111 municipalities), the
table presents statistics for 98 governmental entities that filed late audits and 68 governmental
entities that filed timely audits. Preliminary univariate analysis of each independent variable was
performed. Differences for continuous variables were analyzed using t-tests while differences
for dichotomous variables were analyzed using chi-squared tests. One-tailed test results are
presented for variables in which directional predictions were made, while two-tailed test results
are presented for variables in which no directional prediction was made. Results of those tests
are also presented in Table 4
The mean audit delay (DELAY) for all entities in the sample was 399.66 days. For audits
filed in a timely manner, the mean delay was 248.57 days. For audits filed past the filing
deadline, the mean audit delay was 504.50 days. Results of the t-tests and chi-squared tests
reveal several independent variables that differ significantly between timely filers and late filers,
mainly in the area of report message content and managerial competency. Specifically, the
timely filers and late filers differ on FINDINGS, OPINION, DISTANCE, and the control

5

Additional analysis and discussion of this outlying observation is included later in this chapter.

72

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Governments Completing Full-scope Audits and
a Comparison of Late and Timely Audits
Variablesa

Total
(n=166)

Late Audits
(n=98)

Dependent Variable: DELAY
Mean (Standard Deviation)
399.66 (172.49) 504.50 (142.48)
Range
87 to 1046
367 to 1046
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
Mean (Standard Deviation)
2.12 (1.41)
2.07 (1.60)
Range
0.19 to 7.09
0.19 to 7.09
PERFORMANCE
Mean (Standard Deviation)
5.11 (11.44)
4.81 (13.26)
Range
-70 to 38
-70 to 38
FINDINGS
Mean (Standard Deviation)
4.11 (5.18)
5.33***(5.74)
Range
0 to 34
0 to 34
OPINION (frequency)
21.08%
28.57%***

Timely Audits
(N=68)
248.57 (68.06)
87 to 365

2.18 (1.10)
0.21 to 6.21
5.53 (8.21)
-18 to 34
2.37*** (3.62)
0 to 16
10.29%***

Accountability:

DEBT (millions)
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range
SINGLEAUDIT (frequency)

$17.66 ($35.82)
$0 to $352.04
51.20%

$14.22 ($22.41)
$20.8 to $129.2
55.10%

$22.61 ($48.90)
$0 to $352.0
45.59%

3.63 (1.49)
1 to 8

3.59 (1.45)
1 to 8

3.69 (1.55)
2 to 8

37.77 (45.75)
1 to 238

45.08** (48.74)
1 to 170

27.22** (39.04)
1 to 238

6.78 (6.61)
1 to 24

7.16 (7.06)
1 to 24

6.22 (5.90)
1 to 24

33.13%

46.94%***

13.24%***

Audit Environment:

FUNDS
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range
DISTANCE
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range
EXPERTISE
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range
Control Variable:

COUNTY (frequency)
a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
***p<0.001 one-tailed test
**p<0.01 one-tailed test
Note: For comparisons of governments filing late audits and governments filing timely audits, t-tests were
used to determine significant differences for continuous variables, and chi-squared tests were used to
determine significant differences for dichotomous variables
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variable COUNTY. Each of these significant variables, along with the other independent
variables in the models are discussed in detail below.
The mean financial statement position (POSITION) (measured by the ratio of total net
assets to total revenues) for all governments in the sample was 2.12. The mean financial
statement position associated with audits filed in a timely manner was 2.18, while the mean
financial statement position associated audits filed after the deadline was 2.07. The mean
performance ratio (PERFORMANCE) (measured by the ratio of the change in net assets to total
net assets) for all entities was 5.11. The mean performance ratio associated with audits filed in a
timely manner was 5.53. The mean performance ratio associated with audits filed after the
deadline was 4.81.
The mean total number of audit findings for all governmental entities in the sample was
4.11. The mean total number of audit findings (FINDINGS) issued for entities in the sample that
filed in a timely manner was 2.37, while the mean total number of audit findings issued for
entities that failed to file in a timely manner was 5.33. The t-tests revealed this to be a
significant difference (p<0.001, one-tailed). Concerning the opinion rendered by the auditor on
the fair presentation of financial statements in accordance with GAAP (OPINION), 21.08
percent of the governmental entities received an other-than-unqualified audit opinion. Of those
entities that filed audits in a timely manner, 10.29 percent of the entities received an other-thanunqualified audit opinion. Of those entities that failed to file financial statement audits in a
timely manner, 28.57 percent received an other-than-unqualified audit opinion. A chi-squared
test indicates that this is a significant difference between timely and late filers (p<0.001, onetailed).
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A review of issues of accountability indicates that the mean dollar amount of long-term
debt (DEBT) for all entities in the sample was $17,660,000. The mean dollar amount of longterm debt for entities in the sample that filed in a timely manner was $22,610,000, while the
mean dollar amount of long-term debt for entities failing to meet the filing deadline was
$14,220,000. For all entities in the sample, 51.20 percent were subject to the requirements of the
Single Audit Act (SINGLEAUDIT). Of those entities meeting the filing deadline, 45.59 percent
were subject to the requirements of the Single Audit Act, and for entities failing to meet the
filing deadline, 55.10 percent were subject to the requirements of the Single Audit Act.
A review of the variables measuring the audit environment indicates that the mean
number of major funds (FUNDS) reported by all entities was 3.63. The mean number of major
funds for entities filing in a timely manner was 3.69. The mean number of major funds reported
by entities failing to meet the state-mandated deadline was 3.59. The average mileage
(DISTANCE) between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s office was 37.77 miles—27.22
miles for entities that filed in a timely manner and 45.08 miles for entities failing to meet the
filing deadline. The t-test reveals DISTANCE to be significantly different between timely and
late filers (p<0.01, one-tailed). For auditors captured in the sample, the mean number of
governmental audit and attestation clients (EXPERTISE) was 6.78—6.22 for those auditors
associated with audits that were filed in a timely manner and 7.16 for those auditors associated
with audits that were filed past the state-mandated deadline.
The control variable COUNTY was also significantly different between timely and late
filers (p<0.001, one-tailed). Counties made up 33.13 percent of the total sample. In the group of
timely filers, counties made up 13.24 percent of the sample, while in the group of late filers,
counties made up 46.94 percent of the sample.
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Further analysis of the characteristics of municipalities versus counties is presented in
Table 5. The table presents statistics for 111 municipalities, 55 counties, which were, for fiscalyear 2007, subject to a full-scope audit of their financial statements prepared in accordance with
GAAP. For ease of interpretation, statistics for all municipalities and counties combined are
again presented in Table 5. Univariate analysis of the independent variables was conducted for
the purpose of determining what differences exist between municipalities and counties.
Differences between the groups were analyzed using t-tests for continuous variables and chisquared tests for categorical variables. The results of these tests are also presented in Table 5.
The mean total delay (DELAY) for all governmental entities in the sample was 399.66
days. The mean total delay for the municipalities in the sample was 355.41 days. For the
counties, the mean total delay was 488.98 days. If audit delay was measured as the number of
days between fiscal year end and the date on the audit report, as it has been measured in prior
studies, the mean delay for all governmental entities in the sample would be 312.23 days (267.32
days for municipalities; 402.89 days for counties). These audit delays for municipalities and
counties are much greater than the delays observed in prior literature (see Table 1). In the
overall sample of municipalities and counties, 59.04 percent of those entities failed to submit
audited financial statements to the Mississippi Office of the State Auditor within the statemandated one-year deadline (LATE). For municipalities, 46.85 percent of the audited financial
statements were filed after the one-year deadline. For counties, 83.64 percent were filed after the
one-year deadline. Results of the t-tests and chi-squared tests reveal that counties differ
significantly from municipalities on several of the independent variables, mainly in the area of
audit environment. Specifically, the municipalities and counties differ on FINDINGS,
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Governments Completing Full-Scope-Audits and
a Comparison of Cities and Counties
Variablesa

Total
(n=166)

Cities
(n=111)

Dependent Variables:
DELAY
Mean (Standard Deviation)
399.66 (172.49) 355.41 (171.91)
Range
87 to 1046
87 to 1046
LATE (frequency)
59.04%
46.85%
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
Mean (Standard Deviation)
2.12 (1.41)
2.04 (1.23)
Range
0.19 to 7.09
0.19 to 6.34
PERFORMANCE
Mean (Standard Deviation)
5.11 (11.44)
6.04 (10.10)
Range
-70 to 38
-42 to 36
FINDINGS
Mean (Standard Deviation)
4.11 (5.18)
2.89*** (3.92)
Range
0 to 34
0 to 21
OPINION (frequency)
21.08%
21.62%

Counties
(n=55)

488.98 (136.23)
250 to 799
83.64%

2.26 (1.73)
0.25 to 7.09
3.21 (13.67)
-70 to 38
6.58*** (6.43)
0 to 34
20.00%

Accountability:

DEBT (millions)
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range
SINGLEAUDIT (frequency)

$17.66 ($35.82)
$0 to $352.0
51.20%

$17.97 ($40.51)
$0 to $352.0
45.05%*

$17.03 ($24.03)
$0.6 to $125.8
63.64%*

3.63 (1.49)
1 to 8

3.81* (1.52)
2 to 8

3.27* (1.37)
1 to 8

37.77 (45.75)
1 to 238

30.55** (39.82)
1 to 170

52.33** (53.33)
1 to 238

6.78 (6.61)
1 to 24

6.45 (6.23)
1 to 24

7.44 (7.32)
1 to 24

Audit Environment:

FUNDS
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range
DISTANCE
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range
EXPERTISE
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range
a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
***p<0.001 two-tailed test
**p<0.01 two-tailed test
*p<0.05 two-tailed test
Note: For comparisons of city and county governments, t-tests were used to determine significant
differences for continuous variables, and chi-squared tests were used to determine significant differences
for dichotomous variables
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SINGLEAUDIT, FUNDS, and DISTANCE. Each of these significant variables, along with the
other independent variables, are discussed in detail below.
The mean financial statement position (POSITION) (measured by the ratio of total net
assets to total revenues) was 2.04 for municipalities and 2.26 for counties. The mean
performance ratio (PERFORMANCE) (measured by the ratio of the change in net assets to total
net assets) was 6.04 for municipalities and 3.21 for counties. These differences were not
significant.
The mean total number of audit findings (FINDINGS) issued for entities in the sample
was 2.89 for municipalities and 6.58 for counties. As previously mentioned, a univariate
analysis revealed this to be a significant difference (p<0.001, two-tailed). Concerning the
opinion rendered by the auditor on the fair presentation of financial statements in accordance
with GAAP (OPINION), 21.62 percent of the municipalities in the sample received an otherthan-unqualified audit opinion, while 20.00 percent of the counties in the sample received an
other-than-unqualified audit opinion.
A review of issues of accountability indicates that the mean dollar amount of long-term
debt (DEBT) for entities in the sample was $17,970,000 for municipalities and $17,030,000 for
counties. Approximately 45 percent of the sampled municipalities were subject to the
requirements of the Single Audit Act (SINGLEAUDIT), while 63.64 percent of the sampled
counties were subject to the Act. Univariate analysis indicated that SINGLEAUDIT was
significantly different between municipalities and counties (p<0.05, two-tailed).
A review of the variables measuring the audit environment indicates that the mean
number of major funds (FUNDS) reported by municipalities in the sample was 3.81, while the
mean number of major funds for counties was 3.27. The average mileage (DISTANCE) between
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the auditor’s office and the audit client’s office was 30.55 miles for cities and 52.33 miles for
counties. Univariate analyses revealed both FUNDS (p<0.05, two-tailed) and DISTANCE
(p<0.01, two tailed) to be significantly different between municipalities and counties. For
auditors captured in the sample, the mean number of governmental audit and attestation clients
was 6.45 for auditors associated with municipal audits and 7.44 for auditors associated with
county audits.
The bivariate correlation coefficients among the independent variables included in the
model appear in Table 6. The COUNTY variable is positively correlated with FINDINGS
(0.337), SINGLEAUDIT (0.175), and DISTANCE (0.225), and it is negatively correlated with
FUNDS (-0.171). The OPINION variable (coded 1 when the entity received an other-thanunqualified opinion) is negatively correlated with PERFORMANCE (-0.178), and it is positively
correlated with FINDINGS (0.295). DEBT is positively correlated with FUNDS (0.315) and
SINGLEAUDIT (0.228), while FUNDS is also positively correlated with SINGLEAUDIT
(0.230). The DISTANCE variable is positively correlated with OPINION (0.157) and negatively
correlated with FUNDS (-0.158).
To assess the presence of multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) and the
condition indexes were examined. No values of VIF were greater than 1.50. The largest
condition index (the condition number) was 13.0. Each of these diagnostic measures provides
evidence that no strong multicollinearity issues are present in the model.
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Results—Full-Scope Audit Engagements
In the first phase of testing, an OLS model6 was estimated using as the dependent
variable the natural log of the number of days from fiscal year end until the date the audit report
was received by the Office of the State Auditor (DELAY). Leverage values were examined and
indicated one influential data point, which was removed from the model.7 An examination of
plots of the residuals indicated no problems with heteroskedasticity. Table 7 presents the results
of the regression. The model’s adjusted R2 (26.48%) and model F-statistic (6.943, p<0.001)
compare favorably with prior research of governmental audit delay—Dwyer & Wilson (1989):
12%, Johnson (1996): 17%; Johnson (1998): 21.4%; McLelland & Giroux (2000): 31%; Johnson
et al. (2002): 21.6%; Payne & Jenson (2002): 13.1%.
In the second phase of testing, a logistic regression analysis8 was used to determine how
the variables examined in the first phase of the study affected the outcome of whether the audited
financial statements were filed within or beyond the state-mandated filing deadline. The
dependent variable in the regression (LATE) was coded 0 if the audit was filed in a timely
manner and 1 if the audit was filed beyond the state-mandated one-year filing deadline.
Table 8 presents the results of the logistic regression. The coefficients indicate that the
overall model was significant (χ2 = 43.30, p < 0.001), and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test
indicates goodness of fit (χ2 = 6.72, p = 0.567). The model was able to correctly classify 69

6

The sample includes clustered data resulting from some governmental entities in the sample being
audited by the same audit firm. Ignoring this results in the regression coefficients remaining unbiased (given that
the assumptions of OLS are met), however, standard errors are generally underestimated, which inflates the
likelihood of Type I error. To counter this, models were estimated using generalized estimating equations (GEE)
methods that allow for within-cluster correlation of errors; thus producing clustered robust standard errors. Using
this approach, the point estimates are the same as in OLS regression, but the standard errors are different
(Ghisletta & Spini, 2004). The OLS and GEE models resulted in the same findings regarding significance.
7
The results of the regression with the influential data point included are presented and discussed later in
this chapter.
8
A GEE model with a robust estimator was computed and resulted in the same findings regarding
significance.
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Table 7: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for Full-scope Audit
Engagements
Variablesa

Predicted Coefficient Standard
tpSign
Estimate
Error
statistic value
5.613
0.115
42.424 <0.001

Intercept

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.013
PERFORMANCE
0.379
FINDINGS
+
0.021
OPINION
+
0.245

0.022
0.273
0.007
0.081

-0.579
1.390
3.088
3.033

0.282
0.917
0.001
0.002

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.001
0.029

0.001
0.065

-1.226
0.455

0.111
0.676

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.013
0.005
0.000

0.022
0.069
0.005

0.586
0.068
0.062

0.280
0.473
0.951

Control Variables:
COUNTY

+

0.326

0.074

4.406 <0.001

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
N
Model F-statistic
Prob (F-statistic)

166
6.943
<0.001

R2

0.309
2

Adjusted R
0.265
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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Table 8: Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings
of Full-scope Audits
Variablesa

β

Predicted

Standard

Wald's

p-value

Exp(β)

2

Error
0.977

χ
3.938

0.047

6.947

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.118
PERFORMANCE
1.240
FINDINGS
+
0.104
OPINION
+
1.136

0.134
1.904
0.055
0.528

0.774
0.424
3.554
4.625

0.190
0.743
0.030
0.016

0.889
3.457
1.109
0.321

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.011
0.320

0.007
0.395

2.333
0.656

0.064
0.791

0.989
0.726

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.115
0.594
0.009

0.136
0.453
0.030

0.721
1.721
0.097

0.198
0.095
0.755

1.122
1.811
1.009

Control Variables:
COUNTY

+

1.610

0.482

11.149

0.001

0.200

Sign
Intercept

1.938

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
n
166
χ2

43.300, p<0.001
2

Cox & Snell R

0.230

Nagelkerke R2

0.310

2

McFadden's R
0.193
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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percent of government entities that filed audits in a timely manner and 74 percent of those that
filed late, for an overall success rate of 72 percent. The model had a Cox & Snell R2 of 0.230, a
Nagelkerke R2 of 0.310, and a McFadden’s R2 of 0.193. The following sections discuss the
results of the OLS regression and the logistic regression based on hypothesis grouping.

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency—Financial Statement Ratios
Hypothesis 1a predicts that a favorable report message, as measured by key financial
statement ratios, will be negatively associated with audit report delay. Prior research has seldom
included financial statement ratios in their analyses. The exception is Dwyer & Wilson (1989),
which included the ratio of general fund balance to general fund revenues as a measure of
financial viability. In that study, the ratio was found to have no significance with respect to total
audit report delay.
For this study, two ratios were included in the model. POSITION was defined as Total
Net Assets / Total Revenue, and it measures the extent to which cumulative revenues exceed
cumulative costs. PERFORMANCE was defined as Change In Net Assets / Total Net Assets,
and it measures how much of the current year’s surplus or deficit contributed to the cumulative
net assets. A high POSITION or PERFORMANCE ratio would provide a measure of favorable
report content, while a lower POSITION or PERFORMANCE ratio would provide a measure
less favorable report content. The hypothesis was based on the premise that good news is
reported more quickly than is bad news and that favorable financial statement ratios are an
indication of higher quality management.
The coefficient for POSITION was in the predicted direction but was not significant
(Table 7), suggesting that financial statement position has no major effect on external audit
report timing. The coefficient for PERFORMANCE was in the opposite direction predicted.
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There is no evidence that the good or bad news associated with financial-statement content has
any significant bearing on the timing of the audit report. Hypothesis 1a is not supported by the
results of the regression.
Hypothesis 1b predicts that a favorable report message, as measured by the key financial
statement ratios POSITION and PERFORMANCE, would be associated with audit reports
meeting state-mandated filing deadlines. Similar to the results from Hypothesis 1a, the
coefficient for POSITION was in the predicted direction but was not significant, while the
coefficient for PERFORMANCE was in the opposite direction predicted (Table 8). There is no
evidence that good or bad news associated with financial-statement content has any bearing on
the incidence of late filing of audit reports. Hypothesis 1b is not supported.

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency—Audit Findings
Hypothesis 2a predicts that the total number of findings reported by the auditor will be
associated with longer audit delay. In prior studies of municipal audit delay, the effect of this
variable has not been examined. In their study of the timing of school-district audits, Carslaw et
al. (2007) included an indicator variable for whether the auditor cited a reportable condition and
an indicator variable for whether the auditor identified a material noncompliance in internal
control over financial reporting. In that study, both variables were found to be significantly
associated with longer delay in filing audit reports.
In this study, the variable, FINDINGS, was defined as the total number of findings issued
by the auditor in the report, whether those findings are classified as material weaknesses,
significant deficiencies not considered to be material weaknesses, or findings of noncompliance
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with laws and regulations. FINDINGS was positive and significant with respect to audit report
delay (p=0.001, one-tailed) (Table 7), thus providing support for Hypothesis 2a.
Hypothesis 2b predicts that a higher number of reported audit findings will be associated
with audit reports failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. The results of the logistic
regression analysis provides evidence that the number of audit findings is significantly associated
with audit reports that are not filed in a timely manner (p=0.03, one-tailed) (Table 8). For each
one-unit increase in the number of audit findings, the odds of a late audit increase by 1.109.
Hypothesis 2b is supported.

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency—Audit Opinion
Hypothesis 3a predicts that the opinion rendered by the auditor will have an effect on
audit delay, specifically that an other-than-unqualified audit opinion will be associated with
longer audit delays. The results of prior studies’ examination of audit opinion have been mixed.
Dwyer & Wilson (1989), Rubin (1992), and McClelland & Giroux (2000) did not find a
significant association with the type of audit opinion and audit delay. Payne & Jenson (2002),
however, found that municipalities with a qualified audit opinion experienced increased audit
delay. Also, Carslaw et al. (2007), in their study of delay in school district audits, found that an
unqualified audit opinion was significantly associated with decreased time in four of the five
years studied.
In this study OPINION was coded 1 if the entity received an other-than-unqualified audit
opinion (i.e. an adverse or qualified opinion) and 0 if the entity received an unqualified audit
opinion. The results of the OLS regression indicate that OPINION is significantly associated
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with increased audit delay (p=0.002, one-tailed) (Table 7). H3a is supported. This finding is
consistent with the finding of Payne & Jenson (2002).
Hypothesis 3b predicts that an other-than-unqualified audit opinion will be associated
with audits that are filed with the state beyond the mandated filing deadline. Results of the
logistic regression provide evidence that OPINION is significantly associated with audits that are
filed late (p=0.016, one-tailed) (Table 8). Hypothesis 3b is supported.
Further analysis regarding whether an adverse audit opinion or a qualified audit opinion
affects audit report delay differently is not possible with the data from this study. Of the 166
observations in the study, only three received an adverse audit opinion. One of those entities
filed a timely audit (total audit delay of 305 days), while two of those entities filed audits with
the state beyond the filing deadline (total audit delays of 382 days and 542 days).

Accountability—Long-Term Debt
Hypothesis 4a predicts that the amount of bonded or other long-term indebtedness will
lead to decreased audit delay. Prior studies of governmental audit delay have approached this
area in different ways. Rubin (1992) included a variable for debt-per-capita but found no
significance with regard to audit delay. McLelland & Giroux (2000) included a variable for the
bond rating of the entity and also found no significance regarding audit delay. Payne & Jenson
(2002) included an indicator variable for whether the government had outstanding bonded debt
and found that the presence of such debt significantly decreased audit report delay.
In this study, the total amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness was included
as a variable with the reasoning that any long-term indebtedness, not just bonded indebtedness,
should impact the government’s need to satisfy creditors by issuing timely financial reports.
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DEBT was not found to be significantly associated with decreased audit report delay (Table 7).
Hypothesis 4a is not supported.
Hypothesis 4b predicts that a higher amount of long-term debt will be associated with
governments that file timely financial reports with the state. Results of the logistic regression
provide some evidence that DEBT is associated with timely financial statements (p=0.064, onetailed) (Table 8). This has important implications in that it appears that either the auditor or the
governmental entity are making a conscious effort to complete certain audits (i.e. ones in which
the governmental entities have added accountability to creditors) in a timely manner.

Accountability—Single Audit
Hypothesis 5a predicts that governments required to report according to the requirements
of the Single Audit Act will be associated with decreased audit delay due to the earlier filing
deadline for such audits. Payne & Jenson (2002) included an indicator variable for the presence
of Single Audit requirements and found that the Single Audit was associated with increased audit
delay at the p=0.10 significance level.
In this study, SINGLEAUDIT was coded 1 if the government was subject to the Single
Audit requirements and 0 otherwise. SINGLEAUDIT was not found to be significantly
associated with decreased audit report delay (Table 7). In fact, the coefficient for
SINGLEAUDIT was not in the predicted direction. Hypothesis 5a is not supported, which
provides evidence that neither the additional accountability of those entities required to file under
the Single Audit act nor the narrower filing window lead to decreased audit report delay.
Hypothesis 5b predicts that governments required to report according to the requirements
of the Single Audit Act will be associated with audit reports that are filed in a timely manner.
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The results of the logistic regression indicate that SINGLEAUDIT is not significantly associated
with timely filing of financial reports (Table 8). Hypothesis 5b is not supported.
It was noted that only 27.5 percent of Mississippi entities required to file Single Audit
reports did so before the nine-month deadline. Of those entities, the majority (77.3 percent)
managed to file their full audit report with the state auditor before the one-year deadline. Of
those filing timely Single Audit reports but late full-scope audit reports to the state, only one city
filed its full-scope audit report more than three weeks after the one-year deadline. Of the 72.5
percent of Mississippi entities that filed late Single Audit reports, the majority (81.0 percent) also
filed late audits with the state auditor.

Audit Environment—Major Funds
Hypothesis 6a predicts that the total number of reported major funds will increase audit
report delay. Prior studies of governmental audit delay were conducted prior to the enactment of
GASB Statement No. 34, which required the determination and reporting of major funds, making
this the first study to examine the impact of major funds on audit delay. Payne & Jenson (2002)
included an indicator variable coded 0 if the entity reported three or fewer funds and 1 if the
entity reported more than three funds. Their results provided no evidence of a significant
relationship between the total number of reported funds and audit report delay.
In this study, FUNDS is defined as the total number of major funds reported on the
government’s financial statements. The results of the OLS regression indicate that the total
number of reported major funds is not significantly associated with longer audit report delay
(Table 7). Hypothesis 6a is not supported.
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Hypothesis 6b predicts that a higher number of reported major funds will be associated
with audits filed beyond the state-mandated filing deadline. Results of the logistic regression
indicate that FUNDS is not significantly associated with untimely financial reporting (Table 8).
Hypothesis 6b is not supported.

Audit Environment—Travel Distance
Hypothesis 7a predicts that a greater total travel distance between the auditor’s office and
the audit client’s office will be associated with longer audit report delays. Prior research of
governmental audit delay has not examined this variable with regard to audit timeliness. The
results of the OLS regression provide no evidence that as the mileage traveled increases, so does
the amount of delay in filing the audited financial statements (Table 7). Hypothesis 7a is not
supported.
Hypothesis 7b predicts that a greater travel distance between the auditor’s office and the
audit client’s office will be associated with audit reports failing to meet state-mandated filing
deadlines. The results of the logistic regression provide minimal evidence that greater travel
distance is associated with untimely financial statement reports (p<0.095, one-tailed) (Table 8).

Audit Environment—Auditor Expertise
Hypothesis 8a predicts that the total number of governmental attestation engagements
performed by an audit firm will be associated with audit delay. Payne & Jenson (2002)
measured auditor expertise with an indicator variable coded 1 if the auditor performed two or
more municipal audits within their sample and 0 otherwise. The results of their study provided
evidence that as the number of municipal audit clients increases, the audit report delay decreases.
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Carslaw et al (2007) measured auditor expertise with an indicator variable coded 1 if the auditor
performed more than five single audits during the year and 0 otherwise. They found that auditor
expertise significantly decreased audit report delay for school districts in three of the five years
they examined.
In this study, auditor expertise is measured by the total number of governmental audit and
attestation engagements performed by the audit firm during the year. Regression results indicate
that auditor expertise, as measured by the total number of clients, is not significantly associated
with audit report delay (Table 7). Hypothesis 8a is not supported.
Hypothesis 8b predicts that the total number of governmental audit and attestation
engagements performed by the audit firm will be associated with whether audit reports meet
state-mandated audit-filing deadlines. The results of the logistic regression indicate no
significant relationship between the number of audit clients and timely financial reporting (Table
8). Hypothesis 8b is not supported.9

Additional Procedures—Full-Scope Audit Engagements
Audit Findings
To achieve a more thorough understanding of the impact of audit findings on the level of
audit report delay, the OLS regression and the logistic regression models were recomputed after
replacing the total number of audit findings (FINDINGS) with the total number of more serious
audit findings, those classified by the auditor as material weaknesses (MATWEAK). This
excludes audit findings classified as either (1) noncompliance with laws and regulations or (2)
significant deficiencies not deemed to be material weaknesses. The mean total number of

9

The regression results yielded significant results for the control variable COUNTY. That variable is
discussed in detail later in this chapter.
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material-weakness findings reported for all entities in the sample was 1.30 (1.10 for
municipalities; 1.71 for counties). For governmental entities filing audits in a timely manner, the
mean number of material-weakness findings was 0.76, while the mean number of materialweakness findings for late filers was 1.67. The results of the regression model that includes
MATWEAK are presented in Table 9, and the results of the logistic model that includes
MATWEAK are presented in Table 10.
Results of the OLS regression (Table 9) indicate that the total number of materialweakness findings (MATWEAK) is positively and significantly associated with audit report
delay (p=0.003, one-tailed). Results of the logistic regression (Table 10) indicate that
MATWEAK does have some association with whether audits are filed on time, but it not carry
the same level of statistical significance (p=0.057, one-tailed) as the OLS regression measuring
the effect of material weaknesses on the number of days of audit delay.
Separate OLS and logistic regression models were also computed after excluding all
material-weakness findings and including only noncompliance and significant-deficiency
findings (OTHERFIND). The purpose of these models are to provide more comprehensive
evidence regarding the effect the audit finding’s level of seriousness has on the delay of the audit
report. The mean total number of noncompliance and significant deficiency findings reported for
all entities in the sample was 2.80 (1.78 for municipalities; 4.87 for counties). For governmental
entities filing audits in a timely manner, the mean number of noncompliance and significant
deficiency findings was 1.60, while the mean number of noncompliance and significant
deficiency findings for late filers was 3.62. The results of the regression model that includes
OTHERFIND are presented in Table 11, and the results of the logistic model that includes
OTHERFIND are presented in Table 12.
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Table 9: OLS Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings Classified as
Material Weaknesses Contribute to Delay of Full-scope Audits
Variablesa

Predicted Coefficient Standard
Sign
Estimate
Error
5.656
0.115

Intercept

tstatistic
49.095

p-value
<0.001

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.022
PERFORMANCE
0.441
MATWEAK
+
0.051
OPINION
+
0.222

0.022
0.275
0.018
0.085

-1.005
1.606
2.846
2.600

0.158
0.945
0.003
0.005

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.001
0.032

0.001
0.065

-1.137
0.493

0.129
0.689

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.011
-0.004
-0.001

0.023
0.069
0.005

0.475
-0.051
-0.298

0.318
0.521
0.766

Control Variables:
COUNTY

+

0.376

0.070

5.385

<0.001

a

MATWEAK is defined as the total number of audit findings issued by the auditor that
were classified as material weaknesses. See Table 3 for a description of other variables
n
166
Model F-statistic
6.747
Prob (F-statistic)
<0.001
R2

0.303
2

Adjusted R
0.258
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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Table 10: Logistic Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings
Classified as Material Weaknesses Contribute to Late Filings of
Full-scope Audits
Variablesa

β

Predicted

Standard

Wald's

p-value

Exp(β)

2

Error
0.956

χ
5.280

0.022

9.001

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.149
PERFORMANCE
1.469
MATWEAK
+
0.210
OPINION
+
1.069

0.134
1.902
0.133
0.547

1.232
0.597
2.509
3.819

0.134
0.780
0.057
0.026

0.862
4.347
1.234
0.344

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.010
-0.344

0.007
0.395

2.302
0.759

0.065
0.192

0.990
0.709

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.120
0.584
0.009

0.137
0.462
0.030

0.762
1.601
0.087

0.192
0.103
0.768

1.127
1.794
1.009

Control Variables:
COUNTY

+

1.796

0.466

14.875

<0.001

0.166

Sign
Intercept

2.197

a

MATWEAK is defined as the total number of audit findings issued by the auditor that
were classified as material weaknesses. See Table 3 for a description of other variables
n
166
χ2

41.81, p<0.001
2

Cox & Snell R

0.223

Nagelkerke R2

0.300

2

McFadden's R
0.186
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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Table 11: OLS Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings Not Classified as
Material Weaknesses Contribute to Delay of Full-scope Audits
Variablesa

Predicted Coefficient Standard
tpSign
Estimate
Error
statistic
value
5.603
0.116
48.143 <0.001

Intercept

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.010
PERFORMANCE
0.357
OTHERFIND
+
0.022
OPINION
+
0.285

0.022
0.276
0.009
0.079

-0.468 0.321
1.295 0.902
2.578 0.006
3.626 <0.001

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.001
0.024

0.001
0.065

-1.184
0.639

0.119
0.643

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.017
0.000
0.001

0.022
0.070
0.005

0.754
-0.005
0.267

0.226
0.996
0.789

Control Variables:
COUNTY

+

0.337

0.075

a

4.467 <0.001

OTHERFIND is defined as the total number of audit findings issued by the auditor that
were not classified as material weaknesses. See Table 3 for a description of other variables
n
166
Model F-statistic
6.549
Prob (F-statistic)
<0.001
R2

0.297
2

Adjusted R
0.252
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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Table 12: Logistic Regression Results Showing How Audit Findings Not Classified as
Material Weaknesses Contribute to Late Filings of Full-scope Audits
Variablesa

Predicted

β

Sign

Standard
Error

Wald's

p-value

Exp(β)

2

χ

Intercept
2.107
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.103
PERFORMANCE
1.067
OTHERFIND
+
0.115
OPINION
+
1.299

0.963

4.793

0.029

8.227

0.135
1.882
0.069
0.514

0.581
0.321
2.783
6.389

0.223
0.715
0.048
0.006

0.902
2.906
1.122
0.273

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.011
0.295

0.007
0.395

2.211
0.559

0.069
0.773

0.989
0.744

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.123
0.554
0.012

0.135
0.447
0.029

0.831
1.540
0.174

0.181
0.108
0.676

1.131
1.741
1.012

Control Variables:
COUNTY

+

1.633

0.485

11.335

0.001

0.195

a

OTHERFIND is defined as the total number of audit findings issued by the auditor that
were not classified as material weaknesses. See Table 3 for a description of other variables
N
166
χ2

42.344, p<0.001
2

Cox & Snell R

0.225

Nagelkerke R2

0.304

2

McFadden's R
0.188
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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The results of the OLS regression (Table 11) provide evidence that the total number of
compliance and significant deficiency findings (OTHERFIND) is positively and significantly
associated with audit report delay (p=0.006, one-tailed). The results of the logistic regression
(Table 12) provide evidence that OTHERFIND is positively and significantly associated with
audit reports failing to meet the state-mandated filing deadlines (p=0.048, one-tailed). Taken as
a whole, the evidence regarding audit findings indicates that the quantity of instances that result
in audit findings has a slightly greater impact on audit delay than does the audit finding’s level of
materiality.

Major Funds
As mentioned previously, prior studies of governmental audit delay were conducted prior
to the enactment of GASB Statement No. 34, which required the determination and reporting of
major funds, making this the first study to examine the impact of major funds on audit delay.
Payne & Jenson (2002) included an indicator variable coded 0 if the entity reported three or
fewer funds and 1 if the entity reported more than three funds. Their results provided no
evidence of a significant relationship between the total number of reported funds and audit report
delay. To approach this area in a way that is consistent with prior research, the FUNDS variable
in this study was redefined in a way similar to Payne & Jenson (2002). The variable was
expressed as a categorical variable with 0 indicating three or fewer reported major funds and 1
indicating greater than three reported major funds. Frequencies indicated that 55.4 percent of the
observations in the sample had three or fewer major funds, while 44.6 percent had greater than
three reported major funds. Results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 13, while
results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 14.
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Table 13: OLS Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How the Number of
Reported Major Funds Contributes to Delay of Full-scope Audits
Variablesa

Predicted Coefficient Standard
Sign
Estimate
Error
5.641
0.088

Intercept

tpstatistic value
63.901 <0.001

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.013
PERFORMANCE
0.379
FINDINGS
+
0.020
OPINION
+
0.246

0.022
0.273
0.007
0.081

-0.579
1.390
3.051
3.045

0.282
0.917
0.002
0.002

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.001
0.033

0.001
0.063

-1.220
0.517

0.112
0.697

Audit Environment:
FUNDS(RE-DEFINED)
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.045
0.003
0.000

0.063
0.069
0.005

0.720
0.042
0.011

0.236
0.484
0.991

Control Variables:
COUNTY
+
0.326
0.073
4.443 <0.001
a
FUNDS(RE-DEFINED) is an indicator variable coded 1 if the governmental entity
reported greater than 3 major funds, 0 otherwise. See Table 3 for a description of other
variables
N
166
Model F-statistic
6.968
Prob (F-statistic)
<0.001
R2

0.31
2

Adjusted R
0.266
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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Table 14: Logistic Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How the Number
of Reported Major Funds Contributes to Late Filings of Full-scope Audits
Variablesa

β

Predicted

Standard

Wald's

p-value

Exp(β)

2

Error
0.947

χ
8.634

0.003

16.155

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.117
PERFORMANCE
1.356
FINDINGS
+
0.104
OPINION
+
1.172

0.134
1.893
0.056
0.530

0.769
0.513
3.475
4.883

0.191
0.763
0.031
0.014

0.889
3.879
1.110
0.310

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.012
0.343

0.007
0.390

2.544
0.772

0.056
0.810

0.988
0.710

Audit Environment:
FUNDS(RE-DEFINED)
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.597
0.591
0.007

0.386
0.453
0.030

2.394
1.706
0.059

0.061
0.096
0.809

0.551
1.806
1.007

Control Variables:
COUNTY

+

1.651

0.482

11.709

0.001

0.192

Sign
Intercept

2.782

a

FUNDS(RE-DEFINED) is an indicator variable coded 1 if the governmental entity reported
greater than 3 major funds, 0 otherwise. See Table 3 for a description of other variables
n
166
χ2

45.016, p<0.001
2

Cox & Snell R

0.238

Nagelkerke R2

0.320

2

McFadden's R
0.200
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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The results of the OLS regression (Table 13) are similar to those previously reported and
indicate no significance with regard to audit report delay. The results of the logistic regression
model (Table 14) provided some evidence that a more complex audit, as indicated by the total
number of reported major funds, has some association with untimely filing of audit reports
(p=0.061, one-tailed).

Travel Distance
Regarding the DISTANCE variable, it is reasonable to assume that the amount of auditor
procrastination due to travel considerations might be more pronounced for auditors having
multiple governmental audit clients. As such, the OLS and logistic regressions were recomputed
after omitting all observations from the sample that had auditors with only one governmental
attestation client in fiscal-year 2007. This reduces the sample to 139 observations. For this
reduced sample, the mean total travel distance between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s
office was 40.42 miles. For governmental entities that filed timely audits, the mean travel
distance was 27.38. For governmental entities that filed late audits, the mean travel distance was
49.23. The results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 15, and the results of the logistic
regression are presented in Table 16.
Again, the results of the OLS regression (Table 15) provide no evidence of a positive
relationship between travel distance and audit report delay. The results of the logistic regression
model (Table 16), however, indicates a stronger relationship between travel distance and
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Table 15: OLS Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel
Distance Contributes to Delay of Full-scope Audits
Variablesa

Predicted Coefficient Standard
tpSign
Estimate
Error
statistic value
5.468
0.135
40.537 <0.001

Intercept

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
0.013
PERFORMANCE
0.638
FINDINGS
+
0.020
OPINION
+
0.249

0.025
0.350
0.008
0.087

0.533
1.823
2.484
2.880

0.703
0.965
0.007
0.003

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

0.000
0.032

0.001
0.072

-0.264
0.447

0.792
0.672

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.027
0.025
0.001

0.026
0.072
0.005

1.036
0.346
0.212

0.151
0.365
0.832

Control Variables:
COUNTY

+

0.325

0.082

3.979 <0.001

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
n
139
Model F-statistic
5.510
Prob (F-statistic)
<0.001
R2

0.301
2

Adjusted R
0.246
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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Table 16: Logistic Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel
Distance Contributes to Late Filings of Full-scope Audits
Variablesa

β

Predicted

Standard

Wald's

p-value

Exp(β)

2

Error
1.037

χ
1.300

0.254

3.262

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
0.004
PERFORMANCE
1.767
FINDINGS
+
0.111
OPINION
+
1.265

0.147
2.085
0.059
0.553

0.001
0.718
3.548
5.240

0.510
0.802
0.030
0.011

1.004
5.852
1.118
0.282

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.008
0.383

0.008
0.430

0.904
0.793

0.171
0.814

0.992
0.682

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.163
0.763
0.028

0.156
0.465
0.032

1.097
2.691
0.761

0.148
0.051
0.383

1.177
2.146
1.029

Control Variables:
COUNTY

+

1.511

0.513

8.684

0.002

0.221

Sign
Intercept

1.182

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
n
139
χ2

37.472, p<0.001
2

Cox & Snell R

0.236

Nagelkerke R2

0.319

2

McFadden's R
0.200
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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untimely filing of financial audits (p=0.051, one-tailed). These results provide some support for
Hypothesis 7b.

Auditor Expertise
Payne & Jenson (2002) measured auditor expertise with an indicator variable coded 1 if
the auditor performed two or more municipal audits within their sample and 0 otherwise. The
results of their study provided evidence that as the number of municipal audit clients increases,
the audit report delay decreases. To remain consistent with this previous study, the OLS
regression and logistic regression were recomputed after expressing the EXPERTISE variable as
a categorical variable coded 1 for audit firms that performed more than one governmental audit
or attestation engagement during the year and 0 otherwise. The results (not tabulated) provided
no further evidence that the number of government attestation clients was significantly
associated with audit report delay.

Government Performance
It was previously reported that one outlying observation was excluded from the
regression models in the study. That particular municipality received a $36 million grant during
the year, which greatly increased its PERFORMANCE ratio (defined as Change In Net Assets /
Total Net Assets). That municipality also had a 1,024-day audit report delay. The results of the
OLS regression that includes that municipality in the sample are presented in Table 17, while the
results of the logistic regression that includes that municipality are presented in Table 18.
Hypothesis 1a predicted that favorable performance by the governmental entity will be
associated with shorter audit delay, while Hypothesis 1b predicted that favorable performance
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Table 17: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for Full-scope
Audits; Outlying Data Point Included
Variablesa

Predicted
Sign

Coefficient
Estimate
5.603

Standard
Error
0.114

t-statistic

p-value

48.981

<0.001

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.012
PERFORMANCE
0.514
FINDINGS
+
0.021
OPINION
+
0.260

0.022
0.236
0.007
0.079

-0.548
2.173
3.157
3.270

0.585
0.031
0.002
0.001

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.001
0.033

0.001
0.065

-1.234
0.515

0.219
0.607

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.013
0.002
0.000

0.022
0.069
0.005

0.569
0.035
0.047

0.570
0.972
0.963

0.325

0.074

4.395

<0.001

Intercept

Control Variables:
COUNTY
+
a
See Table 3 for a description of the
variables
n
167
Model F-statistic
7.569
Prob (F-statistic)
<0.001
R2

0.327
2

Adjusted R
Note: Two-tailed test

0.284
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Table 18: Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings
of Full-scope Audits; Outlying Data Point Included
Variablesa

β

Predicted

Standard

Wald's

p-value

Exp(β)

2

Error
0.977

χ
3.948

0.047

6.966

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.117
PERFORMANCE
1.372
FINDINGS
+
0.105
OPINION
+
1.151

0.133
1.808
0.055
0.525

0.767
0.576
3.636
4.796

0.381
0.448
0.057
0.029

0.445
3.942
1.110
0.316

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.011
0.321

0.007
0.395

2.340
0.657

0.126
0.418

0.989
0.726

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.116
0.595
0.009

0.136
0.453
0.030

0.727
1.721
0.097

0.394
0.190
0.755

1.123
1.812
1.009

Control Variables:
COUNTY

+

1.613

0.483

11.167

0.001

0.199

Sign
Intercept

1.941

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
n
167
χ2

44.257
2

Cox & Snell R

0.233

Nagelkerke R2

0.314

2

McFadden's R
Note: Two-tailed test

0.196
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will be associated with timely audit reports. As previously reported, the coefficient for this
variable was in the opposite direction than was predicted, however that variable was not
statistically significant. The hypotheses in this study were based on the premise that good news
is reported more quickly than bad news is reported and that favorable financial statement ratios
are an indication of higher quality management, but the results provide no evidence to support
this premise in a governmental setting. Table 17 reports two-tailed test results for the purpose of
highlighting the need for future research in this area. The results indicate that PERFORMANCE
would have resulted in a statistically significant positive association between PERFORMANCE
and DELAY, if the outlying observation was included in the model. The results of the logistic
regression, presented in Table 18, reveal no significant relationship between PERFORMANCE
and LATE, however, the results presented in Table 17 indicate a need for future research in this
area.

Municipal Audits
Table 5 illustrates that large differences exist between counties and municipalities on
some of the independent variables used in this study. The control variable, COUNTY, was
statistically significant in each regression model that was estimated, thus indicating that county
audits take significantly longer to complete than do municipal audits. This is consistent with
Johnson (1998). To provide further evidence that the magnitude of some of the independent
variables for the counties in the sample did not drive the regression results, separate OLS and
logistic regressions were computed for only the municipalities in the sample. The results of the
OLS regression are presented in Table 19, and the results of the logistic regression are presented
in Table 20.
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Table 19: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for Full-scope
Audits of Municipalities
Variablesa

Predicted Coefficient Standard
tpSign
Estimate
Error
statistic value
5.673
0.155
36.622 <0.001

Intercept

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.045
PERFORMANCE
0.675
FINDINGS
+
0.031
OPINION
+
0.354

0.034
0.419
0.012
0.108

-1.319
1.612
2.642
3.273

0.095
0.945
0.005
0.001

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.001
0.102

0.001
0.089

-0.856
1.150

0.197
0.874

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

-0.015
0.002
0.001

0.030
0.109
0.007

-0.492
0.014
0.002

0.688
0.495
0.844

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
n
111
Model F-statistic
3.684
Prob (F-statistic)
0.001
R2

0.247
2

Adjusted R
0.18
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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Table 20: Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings
of Full-scope Audits of Municipalities
Variablesa

β

Predicted

Standard

Wald's

p-value

Exp(β)

2

Error
1.099

χ
1.444

0.230

3.747

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.302
PERFORMANCE
1.294
FINDINGS
+
0.100
OPINION
+
1.289

0.191
2.299
0.067
0.588

2.504
0.317
2.223
4.812

0.057
0.714
0.068
0.014

0.739
3.648
1.105
3.629

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.010
0.519

0.008
0.467

1.385
1.237

0.120
0.867

0.990
0.595

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

-0.040
0.813
0.030

0.164
0.577
0.036

0.059
1.986
0.668

0.596
0.080
0.414

0.961
2.256
1.030

Sign
Intercept

1.321

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
n
111
χ2

20.485, p=0.015
2

Cox & Snell R

0.169

2

0.225

Nagelkerke R

McFadden's R2
0.090
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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The results indicate that the governmental entity’s financial statement position
(POSITION) is a more important determinant of DELAY for municipalities (p=0.095, onetailed), with a more favorable financial statement position resulting in somewhat shorter audit
delay. POSITION is also more strongly associated with more timely audits for municipalities
(p=0.057, one-tailed). Also, for municipalities, FINDINGS remain strongly associated with
DELAY (p=0.005, one-tailed), but not as strongly associated with LATE audits (p=0.068, onetailed). Finally, DEBT is no longer a marginally significant determinant of LATE in the model
containing only municipalities.

A Different Measure of DELAY
As previously mentioned, the majority of the prior studies of governmental audit delay
measured audit delay as the number of days between the entity’s fiscal year end and the date on
the audit report. In this study, audit delay is measured as the number of days between the
entity’s fiscal year end and the date the audit or compilation was received by the state auditor’s
office. This measure is perceived to be superior, as it more closely represents the date in which
the reports are made available to the public. The date on the audit report is also subject to
manipulation and inconsistent interpretation and application of the auditing standards.
For purposes of comparison, the OLS model from this study was examined after redefining DELAY as the number of days between the entity’s fiscal year end and the date on the
audit report. Results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 21. In this model, the
variables FINDINGS, OPINION, and COUNTY remain significant and in the predicted
direction. The most striking difference occurs with the DISTANCE variable. In the original
model (Table 7), DISTANCE was not significant but was in the predicted direction. In the
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Table 21: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay of Full-scope
Audits: DELAY Measured by Date on the Audit Report
Variablesa

Predicted Coefficient Standard
Sign
Estimate
Error
5.202
0.149

Intercept

tpstatistic value
34.960 <0.001

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
POSITION
-0.034
PERFORMANCE
0.630
FINDINGS
+
0.025
OPINION
+
0.325

0.028
0.354
0.009
0.105

-1.178
1.783
2.925
3.101

0.121
0.962
0.002
0.001

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)
SINGLEAUDIT

-

-0.001
0.082

0.001
0.084

-0.876
0.983

0.191
0.837

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.034
-0.152
0.001

0.029
0.090
0.006

1.164
-1.690
0.154

0.123
0.954
0.878

Control Variables:
COUNTY

+

0.482

0.096

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
n
166
Model F-statistic
7.611
Prob (F-statistic)
<0.001
R2

0.329
2

Adjusted R
0.286
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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5.028 <0.001

model with DELAY redefined, the coefficient for DISTANCE is in the opposite direction as
predicted and two-tailed test results would result in marginal significance (p=0.093, two-tailed).
The coefficient for the PERFORMANCE variable in the original model was in the opposite
direction as predicted. In the model with DELAY redefined, the coefficient for the
PERFORMANCE variable is also in the opposite direction as predicted but two-tailed test results
would have resulted in marginal significance (p=0.077, two-tailed). The findings concerning
DISTANCE and PERFORMANCE between the two models provide some evidence that
different findings may occur depending on how DELAY is measured in the model.

Compilation and Agreed-upon-procedures Engagements
In addition to examining audit delay for full-scope audits in governments, this research
also examines the delay associated with other attestation engagements in local governments in
Mississippi. In Mississippi, the accounting requirements, and thus the auditing requirements,
depend on the amount of municipal revenues or expenditures. Municipalities with revenues or
expenditures totaling less than $1 million may, in lieu of contracting for a full-scope audit of
financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, contract for the preparation of a
compilation report after the auditor applies certain agreed-upon procedures.
Similar to the procedures applied to the full-scope audits in this study, OLS regression is
used to test whether certain independent variables have an effect on the number of days between
the fiscal year end and the date in which the final compilation report is submitted to the Office of
the State Auditor. The research also utilizes logistic regression to test whether certain
independent variables are associated with whether compiled financial statements are submitted to
the Office of the State Auditor within the state-mandated timeframe of one year.
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Some of the independent variables examined for full-scope audits in this study are not
applicable to compilation engagements and are not included in the OLS and logistic regression
models. PERFORMANCE and POSITION are not included since only a statement of cash
receipts and disbursements is presented in the compilation report, and information to compute
key financial performance and financial position ratios are typically not available. OPINION is
not included since rendering an audit opinion is beyond the scope of a compilation engagement.
SINGLEAUDIT is not included since all municipalities requiring a single audit are also required
to complete a full-scope audit. Also, the control variable, COUNTY, is not applicable to these
models since all Mississippi counties received full-scope audits during the year. The variable,
FUNDS, is redefined as the total number of reported funds, since the major-funds classification
applies only to full-scope audits.
The following independent variables are examined regarding compilation engagements:
(1) the total number of reported findings (FINDINGS), (2) the total amount of bonded and other
long-term indebtedness (DEBT), (3) the total number of reported funds (FUNDS), (4) the total
number of miles between the auditor’s office and the compilation client’s office (DISTANCE),
and (5) the total number of audit and attestation engagements performed by the audit firm
(EXPERTISE). This section discusses the findings concerning the following research questions:

Report Content and Managerial Competency
1)

Is the total number of reported findings a significant predictor of (a) compilation
report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated
filing deadlines?
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Accountability
2)

Is the total amount of bonded and other long-term indebtedness a significant
predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation reports meeting or
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

Audit Environment
3)

Is the number funds reported in the government’s financial
statements a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b)
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

4)

Is the number of miles between the auditor’s firm and the compilation client’s
office a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b) compilation
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

5)

Is the total number of governmental audit and attestation engagements performed
by the audit firm a significant predictor of (a) compilation report delay and (b)
compilation reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines?

The Sample:
The data used to examine municipal compilation delay were obtained from the compiled
financial statements of Mississippi governments for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2007.
A listing of Mississippi municipalities was obtained that contained an initial sample of 151
entities having submitted compiled financial statements to the state auditor. Data were missing
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from 17 of those observations, leaving a final sample of 134. Compiled financial statements
were obtained for each municipality either from the website of the Mississippi Office of the State
Auditor or directly from that office when the compiled financial statements were not present on
the website.
Figure 2: Frequencies in Which Compilation Reports Were Submitted to the Mississippi Office of the
State Auditor for Fiscal-year 2007
25
20
15
10
5
0

Descriptive Information—Compilation Engagements
Figure 2 presents a histogram illustrating the frequencies in which Mississippi
governments completing compilations for fiscal-year 2007 filed those compilations with the
Mississippi Office of the State Auditor during certain ranges of days around the due date. Table
22 presents descriptive statistics for compilations filed on or before the state-mandated deadline
and compilations filed after the state-mandated deadline. Along with statistics for all 134
governmental entities in the sample, the table presents statistics for 41 governmental entities that
filed late compilations and 93 governmental entities that filed timely compilations. Preliminary
univariate analysis of each independent variable was performed. Differences for these
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Table 22: Descriptive Statistics for Governments Completing Compilations and
a Comparison of Late and Timely Compilations
Late
Timely
a
Variables
Total
Compilations
Compilations
(n=134)
(n=41)
(N=93)
Dependent Variable: DELAY
289.44
Mean (Standard Deviation)
(191.62)
512.46 (166.57)
191.12 (95.28)
Range
22 to 1,179
375 to 1,179
22 to 365
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
FINDINGS
Mean (Standard Deviation)
0.89 (1.51)
1.56*** (1.84)
0.59*** (1.23)
Range
0 to 8
0 to 7
0 to 8
Accountability:

DEBT (millions)
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range

0.34 (0.58)
0 to 4.61

0.38 (0.62)
0 to 3.11

0.32 (0.57)
0 to 4.61

2.98 (1.13)
1 to 6

3.07 (1.23)
1 to 6

2.94 (1.09)
1 to 6

27.91 (29.85)
1 to 150

35.05* (41.91)
1 to 143

24.76* (22.18)
1 to 150

6.24 (6.05)
1 to 24

5.27 (4.53)
1 to 24

6.67 (6.59)
1 to 24

Audit Environment:

FUNDS
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range
DISTANCE
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range
EXPERTISE
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Range
a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables

***p<0.001 one-tailed test
*p<0.05 one-tailed test
Note: t-tests were used to determine significant differences between governments filing late compilations and
governments filing timely compilations
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continuous variables were analyzed using t-tests. Results of those tests are also presented in
Table 22.
The mean compilation delay (DELAY) for all entities in the sample was 289.44 days. Of
those entities, 30.60 percent failed to submit compiled financial statements to the Office of the
State Auditor within the state-mandated one-year deadline. For compilations filed in a timely
manner, the mean delay was 191.12 days. For compilations filed past the filing deadline, the
mean audit delay was 512.46 days. Results of the t-tests reveal that FINDINGS and DISTANCE
differ significantly between timely filers and late filers. Each of these significant variables,
along with the other independent variables are discussed in detail below.
The mean total number of findings (FINDINGS) issued for entities in the sample was
0.89. Governmental entities filing timely compilation reports with the state received a mean total
of 0.29 findings, while governmental entities filing late compilation reports received a mean total
of 1.56 findings. The results of the t-test reveals this to be a significant difference (p<0.001, onetailed).
The mean dollar amount of long-term debt (DEBT) was $340,000. For entities filing
timely compilations, the mean dollar amount of long-term debt was $320,000. For entities filing
late compilations, the mean dollar amount of long-term debt was $380,000. The results of the ttest did not reveal this to be a significant difference.
The mean number of funds (FUNDS) reported by entities in the sample was 2.98.
Entities filing timely compilations reported 2.94 funds on average, while entities filing late
compilations reported an average of 3.07 funds. The results of the t-test did not indicate a
significant difference regarding FUNDS.
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The average travel distance (DISTANCE) between the auditor’s office and the
compilation client’s office was 27.91 miles. Those entities submitting timely compilation reports
were 24.07 miles, on average, away from the auditors’ offices. Entities submitting late
compilation reports were 35.05 miles, on average, away from the auditors’ offices. The results
of the t-test indicated that this was a significant difference (p<0.05, one-tailed).
For auditors captured in the sample, the mean number of governmental audit and
attestation clients was 6.24—6.67 for those auditors associated with compilations that were filed
in a timely manner and 5.27 for those auditors associated with compilations that were filed past
the state-mandated deadline. Results of the t-test did not indicate this to be a significant
difference.
The bivariate correlation coefficients among the independent variables included in the
model appear in Table 23. DEBT is positively correlated with FUNDS (0.292), and DISTANCE
is positively correlated with FINDINGS (0.198). To assess the presence of multicollinearity,
variance inflation factors (VIF) and the condition indeces were examined. No values of VIF
were greater than 1.20. The largest condition index (the condition number) was 8.0. Each of
these diagnostic measures provides evidence that no strong multicollinearity issues are present in
the model.

Results—Compilation Engagements
In the first phase of testing, an OLS model10 was estimated using as the dependent variable the
natural log of the number of days from fiscal year end until the date the compilation report

10

A GEE model with a robust estimator was computed and resulted in the same findings regarding
significance.
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was received by the Office of the State Auditor (DELAY). The dependent variable was log
transformed because visual inspection of the residual distribution using untransformed data
revealed a violation of the normality assumption. Leverage values were examined and no
influential data points were observed in the model. An examination of plots of the residuals
indicated no problems with heteroskedasticity. Table 24 presents the results of the regression.
The model has an R2 of 0.141, an adjusted R2 of 0.107, and model F-statistic of 4.203 (p=0.001).
In the second phase of testing, a logistic regression analysis was used to determine how
the variables examined in the first phase of the study affect the outcome of whether the compiled
financial statements are filed within or beyond the state-mandated filing deadline. The
dependent variable in the regression (LATE) was coded 0 if the compilation was filed in a timely
manner and 1 if the compilation was filed beyond the state-mandated one-year filing deadline.
Table 25 presents the results of the logistic regression.
The coefficients indicate that the overall model was significant (χ2 = 16.04, p = 0.007),
and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicates goodness of fit (χ2 = 6.99, p = 0.537). The model
was able to correctly classify 97 percent of government entities that filed audits in a timely
manner and 27 percent of those that filed late, for an overall success rate of 75 percent. The
model had a Cox & Snell R2 of 0.113, a Nagelkerke R2 of 0.159, and a McFadden’s R2 of 0.097.
The following sections discuss the results of the OLS regression and the logistic regression based
on hypothesis grouping:

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency—Findings
Hypothesis 9a predicts that the total number of findings issued on the compilation report
will be positively associated with compilation report delay. FINDINGS was positive and
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Table 24: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay: Compilation
Engagements
Variablesa
Intercept

Predicted Coefficient Standard
Sign
Estimate
Error
5.276
0.180

tpstatistic value
29.305 <0.001

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
FINDINGS
+
0.115

0.040

2.854

0.003

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)

-

0.185

0.106

1.737

0.543

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.000
0.397
-0.018

0.055
0.202
0.010

-0.001
1.963
-1.820

0.999
0.026
0.071

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
n
134
Model F-statistic
4.203
Prob (F-statistic)
0.001
R2

0.141

Adjusted R2
0.107
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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Table 25: Logistic Regression Results Showing Factors Contributing to Late Filings
of Compilation Engagements
Variablesa

β

Predicted

Standard

Wald's

p-value

Exp(β)

2

Error
0.624

χ
5.637

0.018

0.227

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
FINDINGS
+
0.427

0.148

8.373

0.002

1.533

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)

-

0.094

0.358

0.069

0.604

1.099

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.111
0.897
-0.062

0.182
0.672
0.041

0.369
1.782
2.335

0.544
0.091
0.127

1.117
2.452
0.940

Sign
Intercept

-1.482

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
n
134
χ2

16.040, p=0.007
2

Cox & Snell R

0.113

2

0.159

Nagelkerke R

McFadden's R2
0.097
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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significant (p = 0.002, one-tailed) with respect to compilation report delay (Table 24). This is
consistent with the OLS results for full-scope audits. Hypothesis 9a is supported.
Hypothesis 9b predicts that a higher number of reported findings will be associated with
compilation reports failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. The results of the logistic
regression analysis provides evidence that findings are significantly associated with compilation
reports that are not filed in a timely manner (p = 0.003, one-tailed) (Table 25). For each one-unit
increase in the number of audit findings, the odds of a late compilation increase by 1.533.
Hypothesis 9b is supported.

Accountability—Long-Term Debt
Hypothesis 10a predicts that the amount of bonded or other long-term indebtedness will
lead to decreased compilation report delay. For full-scope audits in this study, the coefficient for
the variable DEBT was in the direction predicted but was not found to be significantly associated
with decreased audit report delay. For compilations, the coefficient for the variable DEBT is in
the opposite direction than was predicted (Table 24). Hypothesis 10a is not supported.
Hypothesis 10b predicts that a higher amount of long-term debt will be associated with
governments that file timely financial reports with the state. For full-scope audits in this study,
results of the logistic regression provided some evidence that DEBT is associated with timely
financial statements. For compilation engagements, however, the coefficient for DEBT is in the
opposite direction than was predicted (Table 25). Hypothesis 10b is not supported.
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Environment—Funds
Hypothesis 11a predicts that the total number of reported funds will increase compilation
report delay. FUNDS is defined as the total number of funds reported on the government’s
financial statements. The results of the OLS regression indicate that the total number of reported
funds is not significantly associated with longer compilation report delay (Table 24). Hypothesis
11a is not supported.
Hypothesis 11b predicts that a higher number of reported funds will be associated with
compilations filed beyond the state-mandated filing deadline. Results of the logistic regression
indicate that FUNDS is not significantly associated with untimely financial reporting (Table 25).
Hypothesis 11b is not supported.

Audit Environment—Travel Distance
Hypothesis 12a predicts that a greater total travel distance (DISTANCE) between the
auditor’s office and the compilation client’s office will be associated with longer compilation
report delays. The results of the OLS regression provide evidence that as the mileage traveled
increases, so does the amount of delay in filing the compiled financial statements (p=0.026, onetailed) (Table 24). Hypothesis 12a is supported.
Hypothesis 12b predicts that a greater travel distance between the auditor and the
compilation client will be associated with audit reports failing to meet state-mandated filing
deadlines. The results of the logistic regression provide some evidence that greater travel
distance is associated with untimely financial statement reports (p=0.091, one-tailed) (Table 25).
This provides some support for Hypothesis 12b.
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Audit Environment—Auditor Expertise
Hypothesis 13a predicts that the total number of governmental attestation engagements
performed by an audit firm (EXPERTISE) will be associated with compilation report delay.
Regression results provide some support that auditor expertise, as measured by the total number
of clients, is negatively associated with compilation report delay (p=0.071, two-tailed) (Table
24).
Hypothesis 13b predicts that the total number of governmental audit and attestation
engagements performed by the audit firm will be associated with whether compilation reports
meet state-mandated audit-filing deadlines. The results of the logistic regression indicate no
significant relationship between the number of audit clients and timely financial reporting (Table
25). Hypothesis 13b is not supported.

Additional Procedures—Compilation Engagements
Travel Distance
Regarding the DISTANCE variable, it is reasonable to assume that the amount of auditor
procrastination due to travel considerations might be more pronounced for auditors having
multiple governmental audit clients. As such, the OLS and logistic regressions were recomputed
after omitting all observations from the sample that had auditors with only one governmental
attestation client in fiscal-year 2007. This reduces the sample to 117 observations. For this
reduced sample, the mean total travel distance between the auditor’s office and the audit client’s
office was 29.60 miles. For governmental entities that filed timely audits, the mean travel
distance was 25.96 miles. For governmental entities that filed late audits, the mean travel

124

Table 26: OLS Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel
Distance Contributes to Delay of Compilation Engagements
Variablesa
Intercept

Predicted Coefficient Standard
Sign
Estimate
Error
5.192
0.191

tpstatistic value
27.124 <0.001

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
FINDINGS
+
0.117

0.040

2.899

0.003

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)

-

0.179

0.105

1.710

0.955

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.019
0.414
-0.016

0.055
0.200
0.010

0.346
2.068
-11.619

0.730
0.021
0.108

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
n
117
Model F-statistic
4.434
Prob (F-statistic)
0.001
R2

0.166

Adjusted R2
0.129
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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Table 27: Logistic Regression Results Providing Further Evidence on How Travel
Distance Contributes to Late Filings of Compilation Reports
Variablesa

β

Predicted

Standard

Wald's

p-value

Exp(β)

2

Error
0.679

χ
4.237

0.04

0.247

Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
FINDINGS
+
0.400

0.152

6.935

0.004

1.492

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)

-

0.072

0.360

0.040

0.580

1.075

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

0.134
0.906
-0.073

0.187
0.680
0.045

0.511
1.777
2.719

0.238
0.092
0.099

1.143
2.474
0.929

Sign
Intercept

-1.398

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
N
117
χ2

15.059, p=0.01
2

Cox & Snell R

0.121

2

0.169

Nagelkerke R

McFadden's R2
0.103
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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distance was 37.46 miles. The results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 26, and the
results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 27.
The results of the regressions on this reduced sample are similar to the results of the
regressions on the full sample of compilation engagements. Again, the results of the OLS
regression provide evidence of a positive relationship between DISTANCE and DELAY
(p=0.021, one-tailed). The logistic regression model again provides some evidence that
DISTANCE is associated with compilations that are filed after the deadline (p=0.092, onetailed).

Auditor Expertise
Payne & Jenson (2002) measured auditor expertise with an indicator variable coded 1 if
the auditor performed two or more municipal audits within their sample and 0 otherwise. The
results of their study provided evidence that as the number of municipal audit clients increases,
the audit report delay decreases. To remain consistent with this previous study, the OLS
regression and logistic regression were recomputed after expressing the EXPERTISE variable as
a categorical variable coded 1 for audit firms that performed more than one governmental audit
or attestation engagement during the year and 0 otherwise. The results (not tabulated) provided
no further evidence that the number of government attestation clients was significantly
associated with audit report delay or timely compilations.

Funds
Payne & Jenson (2002) included an indicator variable coded 0 if the entity reported three
or fewer funds and 1 if the entity reported more than three funds. Their results provided no
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evidence of a significant relationship between the total number of reported funds and audit report
delay. To approach this area in a way that is consistent with prior research, the FUNDS variable
in this study was redefined in a way similar to Payne & Jenson (2002). The variable was
expressed as a categorical variable with 0 indicating three or fewer reported major funds and 1
indicating greater than three reported major funds. The results (not tabulated) provided no
further evidence that the number of funds is significantly associated with audit report delay or
timely compilations.

A Different Measure of DELAY
For purposes of comparison, the OLS model from this study of compilation engagements
was examined after re-defining DELAY as the number of days between the entity’s fiscal year
end and the date on the audit report. Results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 28. In
this model, the variables FINDINGS and DISTANCE remain significant and in the predicted
direction. The most striking difference occurs with the EXPERTISE variable. In the original
model (Table 24), this variable was only marginally significant (p=0.071, two-tailed). In the
model with DELAY redefined (Table 28), EXPERTISE is statistically significant (p=0.023, twotailed) and associated with decreased delay between fiscal year end and the date on the audit
report. A comparison of the two models provides evidence that different findings may occur
depending on how DELAY is measured in the model.
The analyses in this study indicate that the areas of report message content and
managerial competency, accountability, and the audit environment may have a significant impact
on both the timing and the timeliness of the audit or compilation report. The following chapter
discusses each variable considered in the study as well as the effect of each variable on audit and
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Table 28: Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Delay for Compilation
Engagements; DELAY Measured by Date on Compilation Report
tpa
Predicted Coefficient Standard statistic value
Variables
Sign
Estimate
Error
Intercept
5.031
0.221
22.805 <0.001
Report Message Content and Managerial Competency:
FINDINGS
+
0.131

0.049

2.672

0.005

Accountability:
DEBT (millions)

-

0.238

0.130

1.825

0.965

Audit Environment:
FUNDS
DISTANCE (hundreds)
EXPERTISE

+
+
±

-0.027
0.513
-0.028

0.067
0.248
0.012

-0.401
2.069
-2.298

0.656
0.021
0.023

a

See Table 3 for a description of the variables
N
134
Model F-statistic
4.405
Prob (F-statistic)
0.001
R2

0.147

Adjusted R2
0.113
Note: One-tailed test for directional predictions, two-tailed test
where no prediction was made.
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compilation report timing and timeliness. The implications of these findings are discussed along
with potential limitations of the study and possible avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The timeliness of audited financial statements for local governmental entities is of
primary interest to many parties, and for those reports to be relevant, they must be prepared and
made available to the public in a timely manner. For local governmental entities, audited
financial statements are the primary means for communicating the results of operations and
financial position to outside parties. The auditor’s report also provides important information
about the management of the government, such as the adequacy of internal controls and
compliance with laws and regulations.
Some smaller governmental entities prepare compiled financial statements that are, in
lieu of a full-scope audit, subject to an independent auditor’s performance of certain agreed-upon
procedures, such as confirmation of cash balances, verification of tax collections, and
examination of compliance with purchasing requirements. Like full-scope audits, these
compilation reports are the primary means for communicating information about the
management of the government. To be relevant to interested users, these reports must also be
prepared and made available to the public in a timely manner.
In Mississippi, timely completion of county and municipal audits and compilations has
become an important issue in the state, and new steps have been taken to help ensure that future
timeliness will be enhanced. This study examined what variables influence audit and
compilation delay for local governments in Mississippi. Since the Mississippi Code provides a
one-year deadline for submission of the completed audits to the state auditor, this study also
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considered the determinants of late audit and compilation report filings in Mississippi and what
variables differ between governments that file audits or compilations late versus governments
that file audits or compilations in a timely manner. The research questions addressed in this study
were chosen based on the anticipated impact on audit or compilation report timeliness of (1)
report message content and managerial competency, (2) accountability, and (3) the audit
environment. This chapter summarizes and discusses the findings of each of the 13 research
questions addressed in this study, the limitations inherent in the study, and suggestions for
possible future research.

Summary of the Findings
Research Question 1—Financial Statement Position and Performance Ratios
Research Question 1 addressed whether the financial report message, as evidenced by
key financial statement ratios, are a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. The key financial statement ratios
considered in this study included a measure of financial statement position (defined as Total Net
Assets / Total Revenues) and a measure of financial performance (defined as Change in Net
Assets / Total Net Assets). It was hypothesized that favorable financial statement ratios would
represent good news that the governmental entity would desire be made public more quickly.
The results, however, were somewhat mixed.
Evidence from this study does not support that the governmental entity’s favorable
financial statement position is linked with either audit delay or timely audits. The financial
statement position of the governmental entity was only a marginally significant predictor of
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decreased audit delay and timely audits, and this marginal significance occurred only in
regression models that included municipalities and not counties.
The findings concerning the performance ratios were somewhat surprising. A favorable
performance ratio was not associated with decreased audit delay or with timely audits. In
contrast, the evidence pointed toward favorable government performance being linked with
increased audit delay and untimely audit reports. However, this positive relationship was
strongest in a model that included an outlying observation. This positive relationship was also
noticeable in a regression model that defined audit delay as the number of days from the
governmental entity’s fiscal year end to the date on the audit report, rather than the number of
days to the date in which the state auditor’s office received the audit report. Notwithstanding the
inconsistencies regarding the dates in which auditors date audit reports, this could indicate that a
strong performance ratio might increase the auditor’s assessment of audit risk on the
engagement, thus delaying the audit process with the gathering of additional evidence.
The effect of financial statement position and performance ratios has not been addressed
in prior studies of governmental audit delay. The interesting findings from this study indicate
that future research in this area is warranted.

Research Questions 2 and 9—Audit Findings
Research Question 2 addressed whether the total number of reported audit findings was
a significant predictor of audit report delay and of audit reports meeting or failing to meet statemandated filing deadlines. Research Question 9 addressed the same concern as it applies to
compilation engagements. The effect of audit findings has previously been unexplored in the
area of audit delay in local governments. The results of this study provide strong evidence that

133

audit findings are associated with both increased audit delay and with untimely audits. The total
number of findings was also found to be significantly associated with increased compilation
report delay as well as untimely compilations.
Reasons for this result could be due to a large number of audit findings being perceived
as bad news, thus providing incentive for the governmental entity to delay reporting. A large
number of findings could also be an indication of less competent management, which could
delay the audit process for many reasons, such as the auditor not being able to obtain needed
records because they are either incomplete or poorly executed and maintained. Findings could
also be issued as a result of the discovery of inadequate internal controls, for which the auditor
will, as a result, be required to perform additional procedures.
Further analysis was performed on the effect of the materiality of audit findings on audit
timeliness. Findings classified by the auditor as material weaknesses were significantly
associated with audit delay but were only marginally significantly associated with late audits.
Models including only findings not classified as material weaknesses revealed that these findings
were significantly associated with both total audit delay and late audits. These results, taken as a
whole, indicate that the quantity of audit findings have a greater effect on timeliness than does
the magnitude of those findings. In other words, a larger number of problem areas appears to
slow the audit process more than a smaller number of problem areas, regardless of the materiality
of those problems.

Research Question 3—Audit Opinion
Research Question 3 addressed whether a qualified or adverse audit opinion is a
significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports meeting or failing to meet state-
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mandated filing deadlines. Prior research of audit delay in for-profit entities has yielded strong
results indicating that an other-than-unqualified audit opinion is associated with longer delays in
the audit process. Also, Carslaw et al. (2007), in a study of audit delay in school-districts, found
that an other-than-unqualified audit opinion is associated with longer delays in four of the five
years analyzed. Prior research of municipal and county audit delay, however, has been
somewhat mixed. Of the prior studies of county and municipal audit delay, only Payne & Jenson
(2002) found that an other-than-unqualified audit opinion is significantly associated with
increased audit report delay. Three other studies, Dwyer & Wilson (1989), Rubin (1992), and
McLelland & Giroux (2000), did not find that the audit opinion was significantly associated with
audit delay.
The results of this study indicate that an adverse or qualified audit opinion has a strong
relationship with longer delays in the audit process and with untimely audits, thus supporting the
findings of Payne & Jenson (2002). This finding was consistent across all models analyzed in
the study. There are several possible reasons for this relationship. Bamber et al. (1993) suggests
that qualified opinions are not likely to be issued until after the auditor has spent considerable
time and effort pursuing additional audit procedures and other reporting alternatives in an effort
to avoid qualification. Also, an adverse or qualified audit opinion could be perceived as bad
news, thus providing the governmental entity incentive to delay reporting. The opinion could
also be issued as a result of missing or incomplete records for which considerable time was spent
during the audit process in an attempt to locate or have completed.
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Research Questions 4 and 10—Long-Term Debt
Research Question 4 addressed whether the amount of bonded and other long-term
indebtedness is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports meeting or failing to
meet state-mandated filing deadlines. Research Question 10 addressed the same concern as it
relates to compilation engagements. It was predicted that the increased accountability to
creditors would result in decreased audit delay and timely filed reports. The results of the study
provided no evidence that magnitude of debt is associated with decreased audit delay. However,
the results show a marginally significant (p=0.06) association of DEBT with audits that were
filed on time. Regarding compilation engagements, DEBT had no significant association with
shorter audit delay or with timely audits.
The result regarding the effect of long-term debt on full-scope audit engagements is
interesting. As the magnitude of debt increases, this does not lead to shorter audit delays.
However, governmental entities carrying larger amounts of long-term debt typically manage to
submit their audited financial statements to the state auditor before the deadline. This result is
likely due to the creditors’ expectations of timely information regarding the government’s ability
to make payments on debt when they become due and to assess the government’s long-term
debt-paying ability. This has important implications in that it appears that either the auditor or
the governmental entity are making a conscious effort to complete certain audits (i.e. ones in
which the governmental entities have added accountability to creditors) in a timely manner.
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Research Question 5—Single Audit Act
Research Question 5 addressed whether the earlier filing deadline required under the
Single Audit Act is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports meeting or
failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. Results of the study provided no evidence that
these earlier deadlines affect audit delay or audit timeliness. Only approximately one-fourth of
the entities in the sample requiring a Single Audit actually submitted the required Single Audit
reports within the nine-month deadline. The majority of those entities also managed to submit
audit reports to the state auditor in a timely manner. However, the fact that almost three-fourths
of the entities in the sample filed late Single Audit reports allows one to deduce that if the earlier
filing requirements of the Single Audit reports do not affect the timeliness of those Single Audit
reports, they will neither have an effect of decreasing the timing of the full-scope audit reports
that are to be submitted to the state auditor. This is, however, a complex area in which further
research is warranted.

Research Questions 6 and 11—Reported Funds
Research Question 6 addressed whether the number of major funds reported in the
government’s financial statements is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. Research Question 11
addressed the same concern as it relates to compilation engagements. Payne & Jenson (2002) is
the only study of governmental audit delay that examined the effect of the number of funds on
report timing. No significant relationship was observed in that study. Those results, however,
were based on data prior to GASB Statement No. 34, which required the identification and
reporting of only major funds. This study addresses whether funds defined as major funds have
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an impact on audit timeliness. Similar to the findings of Payne & Jenson (2002), no evidence
was observed that the number of major funds was associated with longer audit delay or late
audits. This result was also observed for compilation engagements.
Payne & Jenson (2004) defined the number of funds as a categorical variable, coded 1 if
the government reported more than three funds and 0 otherwise. The results from the current
study are based on defining the variable as the total number of reported funds. As an additional
procedure, the FUNDS variable was re-defined consistent with Payne & Jenson (2002). This
resulted in FUNDS being only marginally significantly associated with late audits but not
significantly associated with total audit delay. Based on the evidence, the number of reported
funds appears to have little impact on audit timeliness.

Research Questions 7 and 12—Travel Distance
Research Question 7 addressed whether the travel distance between the auditor’s office
and the audit client’s office is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit reports
meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. Research Question 12 addressed the
same concern as it relates to compilation engagements. This area is previously unexplored in
studies of governmental audit delay.
For full-scope audit engagements, greater travel distance has no significant association
with the length of time to complete the audit. Greater travel distance is, however, marginally
significant with regard to late audits. This relationship becomes much more pronounced when
audit firms with only one governmental attestation client are removed from the sample. This
provides some indication that audit firms might have an element of procrastination regarding
clients that require more travel time, especially when they have other audit clients that are closer
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in proximity. This finding could also be indicative of auditors wishing to ensure that the audits
of the county or municipality in which they reside be completed in a more timely manner,
whether it be due to pressure from the local government officials or the auditor’s desire to
maintain a personal image in his or her own hometown.
The effect of travel distance on the timing of the attestation engagement appears to play a
much more important role in compilation engagements. Greater travel distance was found to be
significantly associated with longer delays in the compilation engagement and marginally
significantly associated with late compilation reports. This same result was observed when audit
firms with only one governmental attestation client are removed from the sample.

Research Questions 8 and 13—Auditor Expertise
Research Question 8 addressed whether the total number of governmental attestation
engagements performed by the audit firm is a significant predictor of audit report delay and audit
reports meeting or failing to meet state-mandated filing deadlines. Research Question 13
addressed the same concern as it relates to compilation engagements. No directional prediction
was made regarding this variable since while auditor expertise should result in a more efficient
audit, numerous attestation clients with the same due date necessarily results in longer delays for
some engagements because of the increased workload.
Results from the study provide little evidence that auditor expertise, as measured by the
number of governmental attestation clients, has an association with audit timeliness. This result
is likely a result of the offsetting effect of expertise with increased workload as previously
discussed. With compilation engagements, a marginal association with shorter delay was
observed.
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Implications
Full-scope audits of governmental entities are complex, and many factors affect the
timing and timeliness of those audits. The overall results from this study indicate that report
message content and managerial competency have an important effect on audit delay.
Specifically, a greater number of audit findings and the issuance of a qualified or adverse audit
opinion result in longer delays and later audits.
There are a number of actions governments can take to improve the timeliness of their
audits. Governments wishing to obtain a more timely audit should take steps to ensure that past
audit findings are corrected as soon as possible. Corrections of internal control findings would
result in less risk assessment by the auditor in future audits. Corrections of findings regarding
insufficient records would result in a more efficient audit in the future. Fewer reported audit
findings coupled with an unqualified audit opinion would be perceived as good news by the
governmental entity, and that entity would have incentive to accelerate the reporting of that
news.
Compilation engagements involve the audit firm performing certain agreed-upon
procedures with regard to the governmental entity’s financial operations. These agreed-upon
procedures are uniform, and all compilation reports observed in the sample were consistent in
format. With each compilation engagement appearing to be of relatively equal complexity, it
appears that audit firms are quicker to complete compilation engagements that require relatively
less travel distance and engagements in which fewer findings are reported. Governments
wishing to obtain a more timely compilation might consider choosing an audit firm that is in
closer proximity to the government’s offices. Also, as with governments wishing to obtain a
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more timely full-scope audit, it is important for compilation clients to correct reported findings
as soon as possible.
To corroborate the implications of these findings, an auditor from a Mississippi CPA firm
in this sample was contacted by telephone. That auditor indicated that “messier” audits are the
ones that take the longest to complete. “Messier” audits include those in which records are
missing, bank reconciliations are not completed, and fixed assets are not properly recorded,
among other things—all of which would involve an audit finding issued on the report. The
auditor was from a firm that has several governmental audit clients, and he responded in the
affirmative when questioned concerning whether travel distance tends to play a role as to which
audits are completed first. The auditor cited one particular client in which their records were in
“terrible shape” and the travel distance was much greater than any of their other clients. Upon
further analysis, the researcher determined that the particular governmental entity had a total
audit report delay in fiscal-year 2007 of greater than 850 days.

Limitations
The results of this study are subject to some important limitations. The sample for this
study was not randomly obtained but instead uses data from counties and municipalities from
one state. As such, caution should be used in generalizing these results to other geographic
regions. Also, the smaller populations of the observations in this study are not comparable to the
larger populations of the samples examined in prior studies. Since this study examines several
variables not addressed in prior studies, the findings regarding those variables may not be
generalizable to entities with larger populations. Also, at the time of data collection, there still
existed some governmental entities in Mississippi that had yet to file an audited or compiled
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financial report to the Office of the State Auditor, and these extreme cases might have had an
influential effect on the results.
In logistic regression, a rule of thumb states that about ten events per variable are
necessary in order to get reasonably stable estimates of the regression coefficients (Peduzzi et al.
1996). The logistic regression model for full-scope-audit entities in the study has about seven
events per variable. Although more recent research has concluded that the “Rule of Ten” can be
relaxed (Vittinghoff & McCulloch 2006), an increased sample size in this study could have
possibly led to different conclusions.
Finally, the explanatory power of the OLS model for the full-scope-audit entities in this
study compares quite favorably to the models used in prior studies. The explanatory model of
the OLS model for compilation entities, however, is weaker in comparison. Future research will
be warranted to gain a better understanding of those areas that influence delay for these types of
engagements.

Future Research
This is the first study to consider the timeliness of governmental compilation
engagements. As previously mentioned, the explanatory model of the OLS model for
compilation engagements is weaker in comparison to the OLS model for full-scope audit
engagements. Future research should consider additional variables that might affect the
timeliness of this type of engagement. Also, given that the dependent variable is a time-to-event
variable, another statistical approach other than OLS regression, such as survival analysis, might
be used to analyze the data.
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Also, the smaller populations of the observations in this study are not comparable to the
larger populations of the samples examined in prior studies. Since this study examines several
variables not addressed in prior studies, future research might address the effect of these
variables on larger entities to gain a better understanding of their overall effect on audit
timeliness.
The findings in this study regarding the effect of financial statement position and
performance ratios were mixed. In the case of the performance ratio, the effect on audit
timeliness was opposite of that expected. Future research could examine these ratios as well as
other financial statement ratios and their effects on audit timeliness.
The expectation that the earlier filing deadline for Single Audit reports would result in
shorter audit delay was not observed in this study. A deeper analysis revealed that only onefourth of the entities in the sample filed Single Audit reports before the deadline. A future study
might examine factors that affect delay in filing the required Single Audit reports.
Finally, this study captures data in Mississippi prior to the state’s enactment of rules that
establish ramifications for late audits filed after 2010. As such, the findings from this study will
provide a reference point for a future study concerning the successfulness of these steps after
they have been instituted in Mississippi. This study is an important first step in determining
whether “the goal of increasing the availability of timely information has been hampered by the
absence of a filing deadline” (NFMA 1998).
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